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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, the global airline industry has been suffering from negative 
returns, over-capacity, and extreme competition. This paper develops strategic 
recommendations on how a new entrant can serve the needs of this industry by 
implementing a strategy that allows it to differentiate in such an established and saturated 
market with the goal of disrupting the status quo, gaining market share quickly, and 
eventually becoming a market leader. First, the airline industry is analyzed in terms of its 
competitive environment and the factors that influence an airline’s financial performance. 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the most influential factor in an airline’s fiscal 
performance is its operational efficiency. In order to examine the sources of operational 
efficiency, focus is then given to the flight operations engineering department within 
airlines. A series of interviews were conducted to build an understanding of this 
department’s purpose, its activities, and its pain points. Based on this understanding, this 
paper concludes with strategic recommendations on how to develop and launch a product 
to service the needs of the flight operations engineering market.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Airline Industry; Flight Operations Engineering; Industry Analysis, Market 
Penetration Strategy.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Today’s global airline industry is suffering from excess capacity and generally 
little product differentiation. Price-based competition is driven by excess capacity and by 
the fact that airline tickets are perishable goods and the marginal cost of filling an 
additional seat is close to zero. These factors have resulted in an extremely competitive 
environment where bankruptcy and consolidation are common. In order to improve 
financial returns, airlines must focus on lowering the cost of operations.  
The flight operations engineering department within airlines offers the best 
prospects for cost reduction opportunities for technology-based product innovation. With 
the business objectives of “first safety, then efficiency”, this department focuses on three 
main types of activities; measuring and monitoring performance, adjusting and adapting 
daily operations, and implementing initiatives to increase operational safety and 
efficiency. New products aimed at this market can enter the market with one of two 
distinct strategies; compete within the existing value chain that feeds this market, or fulfil 
a latent need not currently met by existing players.  
Through a series of industry interviews, this project analyzes the flight operations 
engineering department within the airline industry to provide a set of strategic 
recommendations for a new product serving the needs of this market.  
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GLOSSARY 
FAA 
 
 
 
ICAO 
 
 
 
 
NextGen 
 
 
 
 
 
PBN 
 
 
 
 
 
SESAR 
  
The Federal Aviation Administration is an agency of the United States 
Department of Transportation (DoT). The purpose of this agency is to 
regulate and oversee all aspects of commercial aviation in the United States. 
 
The International Civil Aviation Organization is an agency of the United 
Nations. Similar to the United States FAA, they are in charge of creating the 
rules of commercial aviations. However, individual countries must chose to 
adopt those rules and regulate themselves.  
 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System is a massive undertaking of 
the United States’ FAA. It aims to implement a new national airspace system 
throughout the United States that is primarily based on PBN technologies with 
the purpose of addressing problems such as airspace congestion and limited 
access. It is similar to Europe’s SESAR program.  
 
Performance Based Navigation is ICAO’s newest form of navigation that uses 
GPS-based navigation equipment on board of the aircraft to determine aircraft 
position rather than ground-based navigation aids. There are two types of 
PBN Procedures; RNAV (Area Navigation)and RNP (Required Navigation 
Performance). 
 
The Single European Sky ATM Research is an EU (European Union) 
program with the purpose of changing to European airspace. Their plan is to 
implement PBN based procedures throughout Europe to overcome problems 
such as congestion and limited access.  
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1:  INTRODUCTION 
On October 24th 1978, United States president Jimmy Carter signed the Airline 
Deregulation Act. Prior to this act, the US airline industry was governed by a system of 
government control that treated air transportation like a regulated utility. In this system, 
five presidential appointees on the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) decided exactly where 
an airline could fly and how much it could charge. Deregulation promotes a purely 
competitive system that relies on market forces to determine price and quantity of flight 
services (Robson, 1998)Since 1978, airline industries have been deregulated (or close to 
it) in almost all areas of the globe. For example, European Union’s final stage of 
deregulation took effect in April 1997, allowing an airline from one member state to fly 
passengers within another member’s domestic market (Standford University: Aircraft 
Aerodynamics and Design Group, 2005). 
Because of deregulation, the airline industry has been experiencing increased 
competition, excess capacity, and diminishing returns. In particular, in the past decade 
most airlines have been generating little or negative returns. The increasing price of fuel 
is further aggravating the situation. The resulting poor performance has lead to an 
unprecedented rate of bankruptcies and consolidations (TheDeal.com, 2010). 
This paper analyzes the aviation industry, identifies current problem areas and 
gaps, and builds strategic recommendation for serving this industry. In order to do so, the 
next chapter provides a brief overview of a few of the most popular current strategic 
theories. The following chapter analyzes the airline industry as a whole. From this 
  
2
analysis, it is recommended that the primary means of improving returns in the currently 
suffering airline industry is by reducing costs through increased operational efficiency. 
As a result, the paper delves deeper into the airlines’ flight operations engineering 
department and analyzes them as a market segment. The two sections following the 
industry analysis build an understanding of the internal situation of this market and the 
external value chain that feeds it. Most of the information in these two chapters is based 
on a series of informal interviews. Finally, the paper examines a hypothetical product and 
provides strategic recommendations on how to best serve this market with such a new 
product.  
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2:  THEORY 
This section provides a review of some of the more relevant literature that is used 
through this project. These theories provide an understanding of how a new entrant can 
implement a strategy that allows it to differentiate in an established and saturated industry 
with the goal of disrupting the status quo, gaining market share quickly, and eventually 
becoming a market leader. This understanding will be used to help structure the specific 
industry problem, identify relevant issues, potential risks, and decision criteria and 
propose solutions.  
 First, Porter’s Five Forces (Porter, 2008) theory is introduced as probably the 
most popular method for analysing a given industry and understanding the important 
forces that affect that industry. Next, the more recent theories of disruptive innovation 
(Christensen, 1997) and blue ocean strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004) are introduced. 
Then, we look at more practical research on new product introductions; the pitfalls, 
recommendations, and main areas of concern.  
2.1 Porter’s Five Forces (Porter, 2008) 
Porter’s five forces is widely considered as the leading framework for analyzing 
the competitiveness of an industry. In Porter’s opinion, the purpose of strategy is to 
understand and best respond to the competitive forces within an industry. For the 
purposes of this paper, this framework is used to develop an overall understanding of the 
value chain that feeds the flight operations engineering department within the airline 
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industry, its competitive nature, and the prevailing forces. Such understanding is crucial 
to developing a strategy that achieves industry leadership. This section provides a basic 
overview of the framework and concludes with a short analysis of the problems and 
pitfalls of this framework when used within the aviation industry.  
As shown in Figure 1, Porter’s framework presumes that the nature of competitive 
interactions within an industry is shaped by five major forces: the threat of entry, the 
bargaining power of suppliers, the bargaining power of buyers, the threat of substitutes, 
and the rivalry among existing competitors.  
 
Figure 1 - Porter's Five Forces adapted from (Porter, 2008) 
Each of these five forces has a different magnitude in different industries. The 
strongest force or forces determine the profitability of a given industry and are the most 
Competitor 
Rivalry
New 
Entrants
Buyers
Substitutes
Suppliers
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important in strategy formulation. The competitive landscape section of this paper will 
look at each of these forces in some detail and determine their implications for the flight 
operations engineering function of the aviation industry.  
It is useful at this time to mention that this framework has some shortcomings that 
are especially relevant to the analysis in this paper. Mainly, as an economist, Porter’s 
framework is predicated in a capitalist view of perfect market and competition. His 
framework assumes that all players within a specific industry have equal access to 
resources, competencies, and information. As a result, it ignores the effects of 
regulations, government interventions, and international barriers; all of which are 
especially prevalent in the aviation industry. Furthermore, given the global nature of the 
aviation industry, it ignores the fact that the players will have access to varying levels of 
capital, information, and technical resources.  
2.2 Christensen’s Disruptive Innovation (Christensen, 1997) 
Christensen classifies technology in two groups: sustaining technology and 
disruptive technology. The basic idea is that an existing market values a product on a few 
specific criteria of performance. For example, within the disk drive market, at the time 15 
inch drives were dominant, the main performance criteria were capacity, cost per 
megabyte, and access time. Christensen defines a sustaining technology as a technology 
that creates improvements in the performance criteria valued by the existing market. On 
the other hand, disruptive technology offers improvements on performance criteria not 
currently valued by the existing mainstream market, usually at a cost of deterioration in 
some or all of the the currently valued performance criteria. For example, at the time of 
introduction, the 8-inch disk drives offered smaller capacity, cost more per megabyte and 
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were much slower than the then-dominant 15-inch disk drives. However, the new 8-inch 
disk drives were much smaller and weighed significantly less – two performance criteria 
that were not valued by the mainstream market at the time of introduction. 
 
The main difference between sustaining and disruptive technology is their 
strategical impact.  As demonstrated in Figure 2, sustaining technology allows the firm to 
move “up market” to sell to customers with higher needs and therefore, charge a 
premium. The immediate profit margins tend to be larger, however, in the long run, as the 
firm over-serves the mainstream market, volumes become smaller or margins shrink and 
overall revenue may eventually begin to shrink. On the other hand, when first introduced, 
disruptive technologies usually do not meet the needs of the mainstream market based on 
the primary performance criteria that is valued. Rather, the firm must find a niche market 
Figure 2 - Disruptive Technology Performance Trajectory over Time (Christensen, 1997) 
Market Demand 
Time 
Dominant Technology 
Disruptive Technology 
Performance 
Criteria 
Valued by 
Mainstream 
Market 
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that values the secondary performance criteria. Therefore, at the time of introduction, 
both margins and volumes will be lower. However, over time, two shifts happen. First, 
the disruptive technology improves on the primary performance criteria, and while not 
necessarily reaching the performance of the incumbent technology, it begins to meet the 
needs of the mainstream market. Second, the mainstream market begins to value the 
secondary performance criteria offered by the disruptive technology. As a result, the 
disruptive technology eventually replaces the incumbent technology within the 
mainstream market. Such disruptive technology can be used in a disruptive business 
model whereby a new player can enter at the low-end of the market through a niche 
segment and rapidly grow towards the mainstream to eventually replace (or disrupt) the 
established major players.  
Christensen’s model of disruptive technology has been criticised for being mostly 
retrospective and descriptive rather than predictive or prescriptive (Danneels, 2004). 
Furthermore, Christensen has been accused of cherry picking successful cases of 
disruption without considering those “disruptive technologies” that have failed to disrupt. 
As a result, Danneels argues that at this stage of research, this theory can’t be used to 
make predictions of which technologies will disrupt, to make prescriptive guidelines, or 
suggest activities that a firm can perform to ensure successful disruption.  
For the purposes of this paper, however, Christensen’s work on disruptive 
technology provides some interesting strategic insight. When entering an existing market 
with a new product, a firm can use two distinct strategies. The firm can enter with a 
product based on a “sustaining technology” that outperforms the incumbent products on 
performance criteria currently valued by the mainstream market. We call this strategy an 
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“upper market attack” which could probably expect higher initial margins, larger initial 
market segment, and quicker market adoption. On the other hand, research suggests that 
it is much easier for existing players to emulate the sustaining technology; therefore, it is 
less likely for the firm to become a dominant player or to achieve long-term market or 
price leadership with this strategy.  
 The second strategy is to enter the market with a product based on “disruptive 
technology” that outperforms the dominant technology on a secondary set of performance 
criteria. Using such strategy the firm would target the low end of the market, or an 
underserved niche market segment, or a new market segment not targeted by the 
incumbent players. This is a “lower market attack” strategy that usually begins by 
targeting a smaller market segment and expects a slower adoption rate and a longer 
timeline to achieve return on investments. On the other hand, Christensen’s research 
suggests that it is much more likely for the new entrant to successfully disrupt the 
incumbent market leaders and replace them using this strategy.  
2.3 Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004) 
The basic concept of this theory is that there are two kinds of spaces in the 
business world. Existing markets constitute what Kim and Mauborgne have termed “red 
oceans”. In such a space the competitive landscape is well understood, market segments 
have well defined boundaries, and products have well defined performance criteria that 
the customers know how to value, and therefore are priced accordingly. In such markets 
the nature of competition is based on providing lower prices for the established 
performance criteria, revenue growth comes from “stealing” customers from competitors, 
and as such, these markets become commoditized over time.  
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New markets or industries currently not served and therefore untouched by 
competition are termed “blue oceans”. In such markets, the challenge is to create demand 
rather than to compete for it. Kim and Mauborgne contend that there are two ways of 
creating blue oceans: give rise to a completely new industry (as EBay did with the online 
auction industry) or create a blue ocean from within a red ocean by altering the 
boundaries of an existing industry (as “Cirque du Soleil” did within the circus industry).  
For the purposes of this paper, Kim and Mauborgne’s blue ocean strategy is in 
effect very similar to Christensen’s disruptive innovation strategy. By offering a product 
that is based on new performance criteria a firm can grow the boundaries of its industry 
by offering value to a market segment that is either currently underserved or not served at 
all. The benefit of Kim and Mauborgne’s work is their ability to link this strategy to 
concrete firm activities that can be managed and measured to create shareholder value.  
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Figure 3 - The Four Action Framework adapted from (W. Chan & Mauborgne, 2005) 
Based on their research, Chan & Mauborgne identified four main characteristics 
of blue oceans; make the competition irrelevant by changing the value criteria, create and 
capture new demand, break the value / cost trade-off, and align firm activities to the 
pursuit of differentiation and low cost simultaneously. In their 2005 article, they further 
extend their theory with the “Four Action Framework” depicted in Figure 3. This 
framework recommends systematically eliminating or reducing performance criteria that 
has little value to the customer and is high cost, and instead creating or raising 
performance criteria that is valued by the customer. In this way, the firm can create a new 
value curve that simultaneously differentiates the product from competitors and offers a 
cost advantage.  
New 
Value 
Curve
Reduce 
Performance 
Criteria
Create
Performance 
Criteria
Raise
Performance 
Criteria
Eliminate 
Performance 
Criteria
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Later sections of this paper will used the four action framework to recommend a 
product based on new value curve and demonstrate how that product would be both 
differentiated and competitively priced within the existing flight operations engineering 
sector of the aviation industry. 
2.4 New Product Development 
The typical product development process is depicted in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4 - General Product Development Process (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2008) 
In most product-oriented companies, this process is very well defined, measured, 
and continuously improved. The basic idea is that during the first stage of this process 
(the Planning stage), the market segment and its needs, the technology platform, and the 
product’s strategic purpose are formally defined and approved. At the end of every 
subsequent stage, more refined product concepts are generated and tested through market 
research techniques such as customer surveys, conjoint analysis, and focus groups. The 
purpose of these tests is to analyze the extent to which the more refined product concepts 
meet the market segment needs and the product’s strategic purpose as defined in the 
planning stage.  
Furthermore, in most companies this product development process takes the form 
of a funnel as shown in Figure 5 below.  
 
Planning
Concept 
Development
System-Level 
Design
Detail Design
Testing and 
Refinement
Production 
Ramp-Up
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Figure 5 - Product Concept Funnel 
As concepts are tested through market research techniques, product concepts are 
combined or eliminated, until there is only one left at the production stage.  
This process works well for incremental innovations where the new product uses 
proven technology and is designed as an improved version of an existing product with a 
well-defined market. On the other hand, when the new product is based on discontinuous 
or radical innovations, this proven incremental process seems to fail. (Lynn, Morone, & 
Paulson, 1996). This failure is associated with three main aspects of discontinuous 
innovation that is fundamentally different from incremental innovations. First, products 
based on discontinuous innovations use new technology that is untested and still 
developing. Many aspects of the technology may be unknown or improving, and 
therefore, there is a large risk associated with the uncertainty of the evolving technology. 
Second, since the technology has not been used in any existing products, the market for 
the technology is undefined. There is, therefore, another large risk associated with finding 
the unmet market need for the evolving technology, and having to create a market 
Planning
Concept 
Development
System-Level 
Design
Detail Design
Testing and 
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demand for the unique characteristics of the discontinuous technology and the new 
product using it. Finally, the new discontinuous technology often creates new 
possibilities that tend to have their own side effects – political, social, economical, or 
environmental.  As society realizes the repercussions of these side effects, political and 
legal changes cause large and hard to predict shifts in the competitive landscapes.  
Therefore, discontinuous innovations are associated with three large unknowns – 
technology, market, and timing – that create high risks and require a process that is 
considerably more flexible than the traditional product development process. (Lynn, 
Morone, & Paulson, 1996) The main problem with the traditional product development 
process is that in a discontinuous environment of uncertainty and change, it attempts to 
identify the market segment and strategic goals of the product at the start, and evaluates 
product concepts and progress against these preset goals. This is not only 
counterproductive, it can be highly misleading, forcing the new product development in a 
direction that will produce poor outcomes or result in the premature termination of high-
potential new products.  
Figure 6 below depicts the “probe and learn” process used by Motorola that 
overcomes many of the shortfalls of the standard new product development process for 
discontinuous innovations.  
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As depicted in the above diagram, the probe and learn process involves creating a 
functioning “prototype” product that is released to the market with the sole purpose of 
learning from the market. The success of each prototype is measured by the amount of 
knowledge gained rather than traditional business success criteria such as returns 
generated. It isn’t until the final portable products were released in 1984 that thenew 
product’s success were measured using traditional business success criteria.  
The probe and learn product development process can be viewed as “series of 
market experiments” where the first version and first development decisions are not 
important in themselves, but the learning and subsequent models are. In this model, the 
idea is to start probing a potential market with an immature version of the product as a 
vehicle for learning about the technology (whether and how it needs to evolve and scale), 
Figure 6 - Motorola Probe and Lean Process: Portable Product Development adapted from (Lynn, 
Morone, & Paulson, 1996) 
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about the market (which applications, market segments, and product features are most 
receptive), and about exogenous factors such as government agencies and regulations.  
The success of the probe and learn process is based on two important factors. 
First, the company needs to ensure that a proper feedback system is in place that allows 
learning to occur. Second, the company needs to have a long-term vision and resources 
available to allow an iterative process of product introduction. At each stage, the 
“prototype” product is an “approximation” of the winning combination of product 
features and target market.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that discontinuous innovations are much riskier 
undertakings than incremental innovations. While incremental innovations can be good 
for the short term, discontinuous innovations do not produce short term results and may 
or may not be good for the long term. Furthermore, most companies lack the proper 
management incentives to promote such long-term undertakings as managers may move 
on prior to the introduction of the final product or investors do not have the patience to 
wait for uncertain returns.  
2.5 Main Area of Concern 
For the purpose of this project, the main area of concern is to decide whether it is 
better to enter the flight operations engineering market through a disruptive product, a 
discontinuous product, or an incremental product. It is further important to decide 
whether to attempt a blue ocean strategy of creating a new market segment, or to 
introduce a product that will compete in an existing market segment based on existing 
performance criteria by offering superior value.  
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The answer to the above questions requires a thorough understanding of the 
industry and the major forces affecting the competitive landscape, as well as the market 
segment with its current pain points, performance criteria, and decision process. The next 
two sections of this paper build this understanding, while the last few sections build a 
strategic model that combines the above theories to suggest the most effective 
combination of product and marketing strategy.  
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3:  AIRLINE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
This section provides a brief analysis of the global airline industry. In order to do 
so, it begins by building an understanding of the general airline structure, the industry’s 
size, the trends within the industry, and airline classification. It will then conclude with a 
financial analysis of airline revenues, costs, and overall operating profit margins over the 
past decade.  
3.1 Method 
The analysis in this section is based on secondary industry data provided by 
industry research firms such as Datamonitor or university research programs such as the 
global airline industry program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
3.2 Airline Structure 
Most airlines operate through the following major functional groups (Air 
Transport Association of America, 2007):  
• Operations includes flight planning, aircraft maintenance, and all aspects 
of day to day airline operations 
• Sales & Marketing includes capacity planning, bundling, and pricing 
• Reservations & Ticketing usually includes website maintenance and 
ecommerce 
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• Management, Administration, and Labour Relations which can be a 
major undertaking in large unionized airlines 
See Appendix 3: Airline Structure Example of the corporate structure of Air 
Canada, a major international airline.  
Figure 7 below shows the average operating income of airlines in the United 
States. Refer to Appendix 4: US Airline Data 2000-2008, for the details of the numbers 
used.  
 
Figure 7 - Average Airline Operating Income in the US1 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2009) 
As depicted in this graph, airlines in general have been suffering due to high 
operating cost in relation to revenue. As further discussed in the  
                                                 
1
 These numbers are average across 15 airlines of different sizes based in the United States.  
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 section, cost of fuel is the single largest operating expense. As shown in Figure 8 
below, a rapid rise in the price of jet fuel in 2008 is the main factor associated with the 
major losses that airlines incurred in that year.  
 
Figure 8 - Average Jet Fuel Price (LA, USA) (United States Government, Department of Energy, 
Federal Statistics, 2010) 
3.3 Industry Size and Trends 
In 2008, the global airline industry reached a value of $467.4 billion and a volume 
of 2.1 billion passengers. In that year, this industry grew by 6.3% in value and 1.8% in 
volume. By 2013, it is estimated that the global airline industry will reach a value of 
$609.3 billion (an increase of 30.4% since 2008) and a volume of 2.6 billion passengers 
(an increase of 23.6% since 2008). (Datamonitor, 2009)  
As shown in Table 1 below, in recent years, in the United States, the cost of flight 
operations has been between 40 and 50 % of operating revenue. Since the industry of 
interest for this project is the flight operations engineering, then globally, the size of this 
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industry can be estimated at between $187 and $233 billion per year and growing at 
approximately the same rate as the airline industry at 6.3% annually.  
    98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
System Total 
Operating 
Revenue $ 
Billions 
$82  $86  $94  $83  $78  $82  $93  $104  $115  $122  $130  
Total Fuel 
Expense $ 
Billions 
$7  $8  $12  $12  $10  $11  $16  $24  $28  $30  $42  
Transport 
Related 
Expenses $ 
Billions 
$2  $3  $3  $4  $4  $8  $13  $16  $17  $18  $21  
Operating 
Expense as % 
Revenue 
12% 12% 17% 19% 18% 23% 32% 38% 39% 39% 49% 
Table 1 - Flight Operations Engineering as Percentage of Operating Revenue2 (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 2009) 
The global airline industry can be segmented in many different ways. The most 
common segmentation is geographical or domestic / international. The relative size of 
each of these segments is shown in Figure 9. 
                                                 
2
 These numbers are average across 15 airlines of different sizes based in the United States. 
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3.4 Airline Classification 
There are numerous ways of classifying commercial passenger airlines. The 
United State’s department of transportation (DoT) classifies airlines based on annual 
operating revenues in three categories: major, national, and regional (United States 
Department of Transportation, 2004). Major airlines such as Alaska Air, American 
Airlines, and United Airlines, generate annual operating revenues above $1 Billion. 
National airlines have annual operating revenues between $100 Million and $1 Billion. 
Some examples of national airlines are AirTran, JetBlue, and Midwest Express. Finally, 
regional airlines have annual operating revenues below $100 Million and are the fastest 
growing and most profitable segment since deregulation. Regional airlines in the United 
Figure 9 - Global Airline Industry Segmentation (Datamonitor, 2009) 
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States include SkyWest Airlines, American Eagle Airlines, and Atlantic Southeast 
Airlines.  
Another common classification of airlines is based on their business model into 
three categories:network carriers, low cost carriers, and regional carriers. In this model 
network carriers are large airlines flying internationally and usually affiliated with a 
specific country (for example Air Canada). Also known as “Trunk Carriers”, these 
airlines usually operate at an international level, and make use of “hub and spoke” routes 
(see Appendix 1: Hub and Spoke Networks). Like Air Canada, they mostly existed prior 
to deregulation and have since had to struggle to maintain a viable hub and spoke 
business model.  On the other hand, the low cost carriers (such as WestJet) tend to be 
newer airlines, flying more direct routes, and maintaining better profit margins. These 
airlines operate both regional and long-haul international flights. Finally, regional airlines 
are the smaller airlines with lighter aircraft that fly within very specific and small regions. 
These airlines usually provide additional capacity to the large network airlines in their 
specific regions.  
For the purpose of this paper, this latter classification is used since an airline’s 
business model and corporate structure is more relevant to the analysis than annual 
operating revenues.  
3.5 Financial Analysis 
This section analyses the revenue / cost structure and examines the decision 
criteria, process, and lifecycle within commercial airlines. 
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Globally, the airline industry is suffering from low margins, consolidation and 
bankruptcy. This has been attributed to three main factors: economic downturn, rising 
cost of fuel, and overcapacity.  
In general, airline profitability is closely related to economic growth (GDP) 
(Taneja, 2005). The second factor affecting airline profitability is significant excess 
capacity in the market (Robson, 1998). In the 1980s, when western economy was 
booming, the airline industry experienced a large growth in demand. During this time, 
airlines began to increase capacity drastically as they were counting on continued growth. 
However, because this continued growth did not materialize, there is currently a large 
excess capacity in the industry resulting in lowered prices and margins. (Robson, 1998) 
Finally, the single largest cost of airline operation is fuel consumption. In the 
United States, in 2008, airlines spent on average between 34% to 70% of passenger 
revenue directly on fuel. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009) 
3.5.1 Revenue Breakdown 
As mentioned in the previous sections, airlines can be classified into network 
carriers, low cost carriers, and others such as regional carriers. Figure 10 below shows the 
average operating revenue per available seat mile for the airlines in the United States.  
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Figure 10 - Average United States Airline Operating Revenue per Available Seat Mile 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009) 
As can be seen in the above figure, in general, network carriers generate 
approximately 20% more revenue per available seat mile than other types of carriers. On 
average, low cost carriers generate the least amount of revenue per available seat mile. 
This data is as expected since low cost carriers tend to have much lower prices than the 
network carriers and make up in their margins by reducing cost as will discussed in the 
next section.  
Airlines generate operating revenue through different sources. These sources can 
be classified into passenger, cargo, transport related, and others. Figure 11, Figure 12, 
and Figure 13 below depict the revenue breakdown for each of the network, low cost, and 
other airline sectors in the United States.  
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Figure 11 - Average US Network Carrier Revenue Breakdown (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2009) 
 
Figure 12 - Average US Low Cost Carrier Revenue Breakdown (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2009) 
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Figure 13 - Average US Other Carriers Revenue Breakdown (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2009) 
As can be seen in the above graphs, airlines earn revenue from two major sources 
outside of passenger revenue: transport related and cargo revenue. Both of these sources 
of revenue have been growing in proportion of the past few years, and should be looked 
at in more details. 
First, the US Department of Transportation defines “transport-related revenue” as:  
 “Ancillary fees include baggage fees, reservation change fees and miscellaneous 
operating revenue, including pet transportation, sale of frequent flyer award miles to 
airline business partners and standby passenger fees. Revenue from seating assignments 
and on-board sales of food, drink, pillows, blankets, entertainment, or any other ancillary 
items are reported as Transport Related Revenue and cannot be identified separately.” 
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(US DOT (Department of Transportation) - RITA - Research and Innovative Technology 
Administration, 2010) 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 below show the transport related revenue per available 
seat mile (cents and percentage of overall revenue respectively) for each airline category. 
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Figure 14 - Transport Related Revenue per Airline Category (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2009) 
 
Figure 15 - Transport Related Revenue as a Percentage of Overall Revenue (Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, 2009) 
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Since this category seems hard to classify and unrelated to flight path and fuel 
consumption, it will not be explored any further in this project. Similarly, Figure 16 and 
Figure 17 below depict the cargo revenue for each of the airline categories. As shown in 
these graphs while the absolute revenue from cargo has been increasing in network 
carriers in 2002, as a percentage of overall revenue, it is staying relatively constant. The 
other interesting trend is that this type of revenue is decreasing in the “other carriers” 
airline category.  
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Figure 16 - Cargo Revenue per Airline Category (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009) 
 
Figure 17 - Cargo Revenue as Percentage of Overall Revenue (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2009) 
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As shown in the above graphs a portion of all commercial airline operating 
revenue comes from carrying cargo. In recent years, network carriers have a higher 
percentage of their revenue from carrying cargo than other types of airlines. In general, 
the amount of cargo that an aircraft will carry is determined by the desired take-off 
weight of the aircraft. At the time of departure, the pilot takes into account the current 
weather conditions and the designed “one-engine-out” safety procedure to determine the 
desired take-off weight and speed. This take-off weight will then determine the amount of 
cargo that the aircraft will carry.  
Therefore, increased accuracy of the obstacle and terrain data can lead to lowered 
clearance surfaces, which in turn can reduce the climbing rate of the aircraft, result in 
additional cargo capacity, and allow the airline to increase operating revenue. Another 
way of increasing cargo capacity is to offer the pilot more accurate tools for last minute 
adjustments and calculations. This would not only increase consistency and safety, but 
also allow the pilot to decrease safety buffers, which would potentially increase the 
calculated desired weight, cargo capacity, and lead to increased operating revenue.   
3.5.2 Cost Breakdown 
Figure 18 below shows the average operating expense of airlines in the United 
States broken down based on the sub segments identified previously. 
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Figure 18 - Average US Airline Operating Expense (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009) 
As can be seen from the above graph, low cost carriers have much lower 
operating expenses than any other type of commercial airline. In fact, on average, the 
operating expense of low cost carriers in the years 1995 to 2008 has been about 12% 
lower than the operating cost of network carriers. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2009) 
Airline operating costs can be grouped into three major areas: fuel, labour, and 
others (which includes aircraft maintenance, management, and administrative costs). 
Figure 19, Figure 20, and Figure 21 below depict the relative operating costs in each of 
the major segments.  
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Figure 19 - Average US Network Carriers Cost Breakdown (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2009) 
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Figure 20 - Average US Low Cost Carriers Cost Breakdown (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2009) 
 
Figure 21 - Average US Other Carriers Cost Breakdown (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2009) 
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As shown in the above graphs, fuel is a major factor in airlines’ operating costs in 
all segments of the market. The 2008 increase in the price of Jet Fuel drastically 
increased the operating costs of airlines in all segments resulting in negative profit 
margins for practically all major US airlines. Furthermore, as environmental concerns are 
growing around the globe, countries are putting into effect more stringent fuel restrictions 
and programs such as carbon taxing. In the near future, these regulatory efforts will 
further increase the airlines’ cost of fuel consumption.  
As shown in Figure 22 below, the fuel consumption per available seat mile is 
almost the same for each of the airline categories. The interesting trend however is there 
seems to be a consistent attempt across all airline categories to reduce the rate of fuel 
consumption since 2002.  
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Figure 22 - Fuel Consumption per Airline Category (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009) 
The main factors affecting aircraft fuel consumption are flight path and duration, 
aircraft weight, and aircraft climb rate. More accurate obstacle and terrain information 
used in more tailored procedures can result in shorter flight paths and smaller climb rates, 
both of which would decrease the rate of fuel consumption and thereby the overall airline 
operating cost. Furthermore, increasing last minute pilot evaluation accuracy could 
decrease the necessary take-off speed, also resulting in less fuel consumption and 
lowered operating costs.  
3.5.3 Operating Profit Margins 
Figure 23 below shows the operating revenues and expenses per available seat 
mile of airlines in the US between the years 1995 and 2008.  
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Figure 23 - Average US Airline Operating Revenue and Expense (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2009) 
The two major trends can be observed in the above graph. First, both operating 
revenues and expenses have been increasing over time. The second trend of interest is 
that in terms of profit margins as shown in Figure 24 below.  
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Figure 24 - Airline Operating Margine per Airline Category (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
2009) 
As can be seen in the above graphs airline profitability has been quite poor since 
1995 and possibly before. Interestingly, low cost carriers have been able to maintain 
profitability while network carriers have been incurring losses since 2001. In general, 
however, for most airlines, current operating revenues barely cover operating expenses, 
and a good proportion of the time, they don’t - resulting in operating losses.  
It is obvious that in terms of airline operations, at this point in time, airlines need 
to focus on increasing operating profitability. While a lot of attention is given to industry 
trends in terms of growth potential, the current situation within the airline industry 
suggests that there needs to be a strong focus on achieving operating profitability within 
existing markets.  
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4:  FLIGHT OPERATIONS ENGINEERING MARKET 
This section takes a deeper  look at the flight operations engineering department 
of airlines. It begins with an analysis of the business objectives of this department and is 
followed by a discussion of the decision criteria and the change process within this 
department.  
4.1 Method 
There is little significant secondary data available for the analysis in this section, 
and the little that is available is dated and no longer relevant. As a result, the analysis in 
the section is based on interviews. Appendix 6: Interviews, explains the interviewing 
methodology, interview questions, lists the interviewees and summarizes the interview 
results. This section will use these interview results to build an understanding of the flight 
operations engineering market.  
4.2 Business Objectives 
In terms of objectives, flight operations engineering’s primary focus is airline 
safety, and then, efficiency without compromising safety. In order to create efficiencies 
within the airline industry, this department must also overcome the challenges associated 
with working within such a highly regulated environment.  
In order to achieve these objectives, this department’s daily activities revolve 
around three types of activities; measuring, adapting to the latest information, and 
implementing initiatives.  
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Measuring the right things and increase accuracy in what they measure is a main 
focus of this department. Most modern airlines have automated systems on board the 
aircraft that records around 40 different parameters throughout every single flight. Upon 
landing, this data is automatically downloaded to their overall flight management system. 
Furthermore, the latest weather and runway conditions are also continuously updated. 
The accuracy and relevance of the data that is measure have a few purposes. First, 
increased accuracy usually results in better predictability, which in turn decreases risk 
and increases safety. Secondly, better knowledge usually results in the ability to minimize 
buffers and margins, which in turn decreases cost and increases efficiency. Finally, 
information increases knowledge which can be used to plan new initiatives and do things 
that were previously not possible.  
The second type of activities performed by this department involves continuously 
updating daily operations based on the latest current information. For example, prior to 
each flight the dispatcher will decide the aircraft’s exact flight procedure, takeoff weight, 
and fuel reserve. These decisions are tailored to the specific aircraft based on the 
information measured about its past performance. The decisions also depend on the latest 
weather and runway information at the time of departure. Another example of continuous 
monitoring and adapting of operation concerns NOTAMs (Notice To Air Men). 
NOTAMs are basically released by regulatory bodies to warn of an impending change at 
an airport. For example, a NOTAM can describe that a specific navigational aid will not 
be operational at a specific airport for a specific time, or it can describe that a new facility 
is build within the vicinity of the aerodrome. The flight operations engineering 
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department continuously monitors NOTAMs and adapts their daily operations to ensure 
safety and maximum efficiency given the changes at each airport.  
The third type of activity performed by the flight operations engineering 
department involves proposing and implementing operational initiatives. The purpose of 
these activities is to either provide improvement in the above two types of activities or to 
increase operational safety and / or efficiency. In order to do this, the department first 
builds a purely theoretical business case of the form “if we do a, we are probably going to 
see b”. Then they design a an experiment that would require a relatively small initial 
investment and little interruption of current operations to test whether doing “a” really 
results in “b”. Based on the results of these experiments, they will build a full business 
case and request higher management approval for the initiative. This department is then 
responsible for implementing the initiative, measuring the change, and reporting the 
results. 
While all three of these types of activities are performed at all destinations and for 
all flights, this department tends to spend a lot more resources on what they identify as 
“performance challenged airports”. Performance challenged airports have a combination 
of shorter runways, higher altitudes, warmer average temperatures, and mountainous 
geographical areas. At such airports, airline operations tend to be limited by aircraft 
performance and suffer from high inefficiencies.  
4.3 Decision Criteria 
The single most important factor in any airline’s decision process is the business 
case. For airlines, the challenge in making a business case revolves around being able to 
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prove the case. Proving relies on the ability to measure accurately and reliably the impact 
of the required investment. 
The ability to measure performance seems to be one of the major challenges of 
the flight operations engineering department. On any single flight, there are a lot of 
factors affecting fuel burn such as wind, temperature, barometric pressure, weather 
patterns, aircraft weight, drag, flight path, air traffic controller instructions, pilot 
decisions, and so on. (see section Factors affecting Fuel Burn). Today, most modern 
airlines have an ACMS (Aircraft Monitoring System) function that automatically records 
40 parameters or more on every flight. This information is very detailed and specific.  
When the information is used to monitor a specific aircraft, it can be very useful 
in providing near real-time information on issues that could be a safety concern and in 
allowing flight operations to be tailored to the specifics of the actual aircraft in order to 
increase safety and efficiency. However, at the aggregate level, there are major 
challenges in using this data to determine the actual value generated by a specific 
investment or initiative. The main reason quoted for these challenges was that there are 
simply too many parameters and too many variables creating too much noise. When 
asked about what is measured and monitored at the aggregate level, common answers 
included looking at the overall fuel burn from last year, adapting it for major changes 
such as new destination, and comparing it to this year’s fuel bill. Almost all interviewer 
expressed that looking at the data at any other level of granularity could be misleading.  
In terms of decision criteria, a logical deduction that there are efficiencies to be 
gained in a specific area is usually enough to initiate in a relatively small investment in an 
experiment that proves the business case.  The harder part is designing an experiment that 
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requires little upfront investment, creates negligible operational disruption, and can 
provide results that can be extrapolated to the larger business case.  
In terms of decision makers, it seems that most such business cases are initiated 
by middle management or at the level of the director of the flight operations engineering 
department. Upper management must agree to the initial investment and will definitely 
have to approve the final investment. Once the business case is approved, the change is 
usually “pushed down” through the airline operations. In all interviews, all examples of 
changes given were initiated and implemented in a top-down fashion.  
4.4 Change Process 
Once the business case is approved, the extent and speed of adoption depends 
largely on the airline structure. The smaller, flatter, and more agile airlines tend to adopt a 
“just do it” culture. In such cultures adoptions is much quicker and they are more likely 
to invest in even the smallest gains if they believe in the business case. In larger more 
unionized airlines, the next question is the impact on the unions, crews, and so on. It’s not 
necessarily that adoption will not happen, but rather it is a longer process. If the 
efficiencies offered are small, the cost of going through that process may be larger than 
the perceived efficiencies, and therefore, adoption may not happen. As a result, smaller 
and more agile airlines are more likely to make investments that have smaller returns, as 
long as they believe in the validity of the business case. 
The process and duration of the actual implementation depends on a few factors. 
First, it depends on how many external entities need to be involved in the change. A 
change that involves buying form a third party will usually require a bidding a process 
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and time for the third party to deliver the desired parts. A change requires regulatory 
approval is largely dependent on the country, the mandates of the authorities, and their 
knowledge of the technology. For example, approving new RNP procedures is highly 
dependent on the authority’s mandate to facilitate such approvals and their familiarity 
with RNP technology.   
Internally, the change process depends on the extent of the change and the size of 
the airline. If aircrafts need to be upgraded, then the change will happen through the 
airplane’s preset maintenance schedule. The size and diversity of the fleet will have a 
large impact on the duration of this change. If training is required, depending on the type 
of training, for example, classroom, simulator, or online training, then the crew needs to 
be trained in small groups to allow continuing daily airline operations.    
In general, however, all changes described through the interviews took a 
minimum of one year to implement. Many of the bigger changes were planned into a 
five-year plan.  
Once the change is implemented, it will be integrated into the other two types of 
activities performed by the flight operations engineering department; namely measuring 
performance and adapting daily operations. The gains from the change are continuously 
measured, reported to upper management, and used to measure the success of the 
initiative.  
4.5 Conclusion 
A diverse set of criteria can be used to segment the global airline industry. The 
most common segmentation involves segmenting based on geographic location, type of 
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service (cargo, passenger, etc), type of operations (local, regional, international, etc), size 
of operations, and fleet type. Based on the interviews performed, this section 
recommends a different approach to segmenting the flight operations engineering market 
within the global airline industry.  
The first and most important factor based on which this market should be 
segmented is the airline’s overall operational maturity. It is important to acknowledge 
that airline, like most other commercial ventures, will first and foremost invest in what 
they perceive as have the largest return for the smallest investment. Airlines with 
immature operations are most likely to find the largest returns in other parts of their 
operations such as schedule, labour, and equipment upgrade.  
The second most important factor that should be considered when segmenting the 
flight operations engineering market is the airline’s structure and culture. This will 
dependent largely on the type of product or service offered. Larger, more hierarchical 
airlines are more likely to adopt bigger projects and projects that have low impact on 
existing crew and operations. On the other hand, smaller, flatter airlines are more likely 
to adopt smaller projects and are usually more friendly to changing existing processes 
and airline operations.  
The final factor that should be considered is the type of airline operations as it 
will result in a different magnitude and prioritization of problems. The characteristic to 
consider is highly dependent on the type of product or service. For example airlines that 
operate internationally are much more susceptible to currency and fuel hedging. As the 
cost of jet fuel and the value of currencies change at different rates in different countries, 
the operational cost of international airlines changes relative to one another. As a result, 
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in a very short time span, these changes can become a source of competitive advantage or 
disadvantage allowing one international operator to undercut the rest of the market over 
the same route.   
Another differentiating factor in the type of airline operations is airlines that fly 
mostly the longer distances as opposed to airlines that fly shorter routes. As described in 
the Factors affecting Fuel Burn section of Appendix 6: Interviews, the majority of the 
fuel consumed during a single flight occurs during take-off and climbing. When looking 
at average fuel consumed per distance (miles or kilometres), airlines that fly the longer 
distances seem to have better fuel efficiency per kilometre than airlines flying the shorter 
distances. As a result, if the product or service offered where to decrease fuel 
consumption during the take-off or climbing stages of the flight, airlines flying the 
shorter distance will experience a much better return and can be offered a stronger 
business case than those flying the longer routes.  
A third example of a differentiating factor in the type of airline operations is the 
diversity of destinations. Airlines that operate at similar airports and in similar regions of 
the world require much less diversity in their fleet. Airlines such as WestJet and 
Southwest are operating a single aircraft type fleet. This offers them flexibilities in 
schedule, since all aircraft and all crew can fly to all destinations, which results in cost 
efficiencies in scheduling and labour. However, this flexibility has a side effect of 
limiting the types of experiments that can be designed to prove business cases. In such 
cases, it is impractical to implement a change to a few select aircraft or to train only a few 
crewmembers. The side effects of trying to schedule operations so that those few 
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crewmembers are always flying those few aircraft at the selected destinations would 
make the experiment very costly and practically impossible.  
As a result of the interviews, it is the recommendation of this paper that 
geographical location is in general not a good segmentation category for this market. 
Geographical location would only matter when regulatory approval is necessary for the 
suggested changes. If the change involves new technology and requires training the 
regulatory bodies in order to gain approval, interviewers suggested that a local airline 
who is the largest operator at a specific airport has the strongest chance at gaining such 
approval. Foreign operators and small operator are not likely to get access to a lot of time 
and resources from local regulatory bodies. 
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5:  FLIGHT OPS ENGINEERING VALUE CHAIN 
This section looks at the value chain that feed the needs of the flight operations 
engineering department. A competitive analysis is performed to determine the 
competitive environments for each of the main sectors that offer services to the flight 
operations engineering department. This understanding is then used in the next section to 
provide recommendations for new product development and market penetration 
strategies. 
5.1 Value Chain 
Within an airline’s operation function, the flight operations engineering 
department is in charge of planning the details of the daily airline flight paths and 
procedures, and improving flight performance.  
In order to understand the activities of the flight operations engineering group, 
we need to provide a short description of a typical flight procedure. A few days prior to 
each scheduled flight, the pilot receives a “pre-flight briefing” package. Based on the 
expected weather conditions, this package specifies not only the aircraft and flight path, 
but also such details as take-off weight and speed, optimal fuel necessary, and flight time. 
Hours before the actual flight, the pilot picks up the final “flight release” package and all 
the “NOTAM” (Notice to Airmen) associated with the flight route. At the time of flight, 
based on the actual conditions, the pilot will make all final decisions such as weight, fuel, 
flight path, and take-off speed.  
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In order to build the pre-flight briefing package, the flight operations 
engineering department has already built a set of predefined flight procedures. Each flight 
is divided into three parts: take-off, enroute, and landing. Each part of the flight will have 
associated flight procedures and charts for each aircraft type flown by that airline. In 
addition to the desired flight paths, there will also be safety procedures which are also the 
main drivers of the maximum take-off weight and the required take-off speed.  
Figure 25 below depicts some of the inputs into flight operations engineering. 
This group selects the procedures, and is also in charge of monitoring and improving 
airline flight operations performance. Performance activities can be divided into two 
groups. First is the “static performance” analysis which involves looking at the existing 
set of procedures to improve performance. Typically, the goal would be to provide a 
noticeable improvement through a major change in one area (for example by changing 
the entire flight path to go between the mountains rather than around the mountains).  The 
second type of performance improvement is through “dynamic performance” analysis, 
which would involve providing the pilots with more precise tools that allow more precise 
last minute optimization based on the actual weather conditions. This increased accuracy 
would allow the pilots to reduce the “buffers” that are added for safety, provide more 
consistency, and improve performance by small factors on every flight that would add up 
across many flights.  
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Figure 25 - Airline Flight Operations Engineering Value Chain (Wass, 2010) 
 
Aeronautical data includes any physical and geographical data necessary for 
commercial flight. This includes obstacle data, terrain data, and data about navigational 
aids. Since commercial airlines fly very high en route altitudes, the data of interest to 
airlines is at the departure and arrival airports. This data can be owned and provided by a 
variety of parties depending on the country. Usually the data is owned by some type of 
government agency or by individual airports, considered “public” in nature, and provided 
for use close to free of charge. However, this public data tends to be too inaccurate to 
create the most efficient flight path. Increasing the accuracy involves incurring 
measurement costs on an on-going basis as construction occurs. To avoid these costs, 
safety buffers are added to the height of these obstacles that can be as large or even larger 
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than the estimated obstacle height. The result is higher operational cost per flight due to  
the increased  obstacle clearance that leads to a higher aircraft flight path, increased flight 
time, and fuel consumption.  
The aeronautical data chart is then used to produce a number of standard flight 
procedures. Flight  arrival and departure procedures calculate the safest and most 
effective flight path to and from each runway at an airport. There are many procedures 
for each airport to accomodate factors such as runway, direction of the wind, type of 
aircraft, and aircraft capabilities. Airlines can chose to fly “public procedures” provided 
by the national agencies or to develop and fly personalized procedures that must be 
approved by a national agency.  
However, before a pilot can fly a procedure, it must be “charted”. This activity 
involves turning the procedure data into a one page “chart” that graphically depicts the 
flight path and pertinent information. During the flight, the pilot carries a physical form 
of the procedure chart, which is used to fly the procedure path. The difficulty is that 
procedures are subject to constant change as aeronautical data and procedure 
development criteria are updated. As a result, most airlines incur the cost of charting and 
printing on a regular basis.  
Procedure data, schedules, and flight paths are also used to plan daily airline 
operations and build pre-flight briefing and flight release packages for the pilot. In 
addition, the flight operations engineering department also has the responsibility to 
constantly monitor all of these activities and improve the overall performance of the 
airline’s operations. In order to help with this activity, most airlines monitor operation 
cost at a very granular level through data gathering equipment on the aircraft itself.  
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Depending on the airline, the different activities in this value chain may be 
performed internally or outsourced. In general, aeronautical data, and charting are 
outsourced. On the arrival side, procedure design is mostly outsourced and generic. 
However on the departure side, most major airlines use tailored procedures, which, 
depending on the airline, is either done internally or with some consulting help. This 
difference is due to the fact on the arrival end, in order to ensure airway safety, the 
airport’s air traffic controllers prefer that airlines follow the same generic flight paths 
rather than allowing airline specific flight paths. On the departure end, however, the 
airways have been cleared for the aircraft, and therefore, the pilot is given a lot more 
freedom to use tailored flight paths. Tailored departure flight paths mean more efficient 
operations on departure than arrival procedures. 
Performance optimization is generally done internally as it is very specific to 
the airline’s operations. There is a large array of software tools available to assist with 
data gathering, performance monitoring, and overall analysis.  
Figure 26 below shows the estimated breakdown of the cost of each activity in 
this value chain to the average airline. 
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Figure 26 - Airline Flight Operations Engineering Cost (Wass, 2010) 
Charting is by far the most expensive activity in airline flight operations 
engineering. There are two main reasons. First, procedures must be charted on a regular 
basis and therefore it is a recurring cost. Second, one supplier - Jeppesen has patented the 
graphical representation of procedure charts that has now become industry standard. As a 
result, it enjoys monopoly-like power in charting and extracts large rents from the 
airlines. The next section, Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference., analyzes the 
competitive landscape for this overall value chain and Jeppesen’s position in more detail.  
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5.2 Competitive Landscape 
This section uses Porter’s Five Forces (Porter, 2008) framework (as described in 
section 2.1) to build an overall understanding of the competitive landscape within the 
value chain for the flight operations engineering sector of the global aviation industry.  
The single most important aspect of any strategic analysis is first how we define 
our industry. Globally, many different standards, regulatory bodies, and levels of 
government intervention affect the aviation industry. Furthermore, airlines can be 
classified in many different ways according to size of operations, flight paths (long haul 
v. Short haul), or type of airline (low cost / high fare). However, all commercial airlines 
must perform flight operations engineering in one form or another. This section analyses 
how each of Porter’s five forces are manifested for different types of airlines. In later 
sections, this analysis is used to decide how to segment the market to develop the most 
effective market penetration strategy.  
5.2.1 Aeronautical Data – Public Agencies 
Aeronautical data is mostly considered “public” data and provided close to free of 
charge by national agencies. Examples of such agencies include the United States Federal 
Aviation Administration and Canada’s Nav Canada agency. The problem, however, is 
that the data is inaccurate. Safety is assured by adding large accuracy buffers that result in 
higher flight altitudes, more fuel consumption, and higher airline operating cost.  
In some cases, when an airline is considering improving performance through 
tailored procedures, they can incur the cost of surveying specific areas or obstacles of 
interest to increase accuracy. While there are companies that attempt to act as aggregators 
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of airline information (for example IAPA’s Airport and Obstacle Database (oadb) (IATA, 
2004)), this paper doubts the extent to which airlines participate in aggregation. 
Information sharing is voluntary and the tailored procedures based on this increased 
accuracy could be considered a source of competitive advantage.  
Aeronautical 
Data 
Impact Comments 
Threat of 
New Entry 
Low There has been no significant new entries in the past decade. 
Geographical areas are large and local details are constantly 
changing making collection of accurate data an expensive 
undertaking. At the same time, less accurate public data and 
procedures are provided to airlines free of charge. In order to 
convince airlines to pay for more accurate information, 
return on investment needs to be proven, which has so far 
been hard to do.  
Power of 
Supplier 
N/A No suppliers 
Power of 
Buyer 
Low The most procedure designers and airlines are able to do is 
lobby the government. So far, it has not been very effective. 
Threat of 
Substitutes 
Low The only substitute is for procedure designers and airlines to 
measure their own data. Since the areas are large and 
constantly changing, this tends to be an expensive task that 
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doesn’t provide enough returns for one airline to perform.  
Existing 
Competitor 
Rivalry 
None Usually this data is provided by a single public agency for 
each national or geographical area.  
Table 2 - Aeronautical Data - Porter's Five Forces Analysis (Porter, 2008) 
5.2.2 Procedure Design – Public Agencies / Internal / Consulting 
Similar to the Aeronautical data public procedures are provided close to free of 
charge by public agencies. In Canada and the United States, the same agency that 
provides access to the public aeronautical data, also provide the public procedures. 
However, these public procedures tend to be very generic and completely independent of 
airline or overall flight path. In order to accommodate everyone, they tend to use very 
large clearance areas resulting in longer flight paths and increase airline operational costs.  
In order to gain operational efficiencies, some airlines  create tailored procedures. 
The activity of specialized procedure design is either performed internally or outsourced 
to third party firms. There are two types of procedure design firms. There are those firms 
that compete globally and are usually subsidiaries of much larger firms. These types of 
firms usually consider procedure design as a value added service to the products offered 
by their parent companies. For example, Naverus (GE Subsidiary), Quovadis (Airbus 
Subsidiary), and Jeppesen (Boeing Subsidiary) all compete against one another globally.  
On the other hand, there are lots of smaller firms that compete regionally. In general, both 
types of firms behave like consultants that help an airline improve multiple areas of 
performance including procedure design.   
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If procedure design was divided into three components of approach, departure, 
and enroute procedures, then airlines use mostly public procedures on the approach side 
and mostly tailored procedures on the departure side. As described previously, the main 
reason for this is the air traffic controllers’ reluctance to allow tailored flight paths during 
approaches.  
Procedure 
Design 
Impact Comments 
Threat of 
New Entry 
High There are few barriers to entry. Companies performing 
procedure design are similar to consulting firms. Any person 
or group of people with procedure design experience can start 
a small firm and provide consulting type services to airlines 
based on reputation and personal connections.   
Power of 
Supplier 
Low The suppliers are the aeronautical data providers that tend to 
be public agencies providing the information close to free of 
charge.  
Power of 
Buyer 
High Airlines are large and have high bargaining power. Procedure 
designers tend to be much smaller than airlines, regional, and 
have to compete with the free public procedures.   
Threat of 
Substitutes 
High About 80% of commercial flights use public procedures. 
Existing High Competition is mostly based on reputation and personal 
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Competitor 
Rivalry 
connections. Procedure design firms tend to be small.  
Table 3 - Procedure Design - Porter's Five Forces Analysis (Porter, 2008) 
5.2.3 Charting – Oligopoly 
Charting is the process of producing a graphical representation of the procedure. 
Each firm that produces charts patents the symbols and layout used for this graphical 
representation. Since pilots are trained and get used to a specific representation, these 
patents create large switching costs for the airlines, and therefore, large entry barriers for 
competitors.  
As a result, charting is an oligopoly with two main players owning over 90% of 
the market: Jeppesen (Boeing Subsidiary) and Lido (Lufthansa Subsidiary). Today, 
Jeppesen’s graphical representation has become the industry standard, allowing Jeppesen 
to enjoy a very large share of this market (estimated at over 70%). (Wass, 2010) 
Charting Impact Comments 
Threat of 
New Entry 
Low Jeppesen has the patent on the graphical depiction of 
procedures that has become the industry standard. Since 
pilots are trained to read that specific depiction, it is very hard 
for anyone else to compete within this market. 
Power of 
Supplier 
Low Suppliers are public agencies providing public procedures 
and data this is basically free of charge (about 80% of 
procedures flown and therefore charted) or a multitude of 
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small procedure designers.  
Power of 
Buyer 
Low Even public procedures must be charted before they are used 
by the pilot. As a result all airlines flying commercially will 
be needing this service.   
Threat of 
Substitutes 
Low Pilots are trained to use charts to determine flight path. This 
retraining would be both costly and create safety concerns.  
Existing 
Competitor 
Rivalry 
Low It’s practically a monopoly.   
Table 4 - Charting - Porter's Five Forces Analysis (Porter, 2008) 
5.2.4 Flight Operations Engineering – Internal 
In most airlines, the activities involved in flight operations engineering is 
performed internally using inputs from the different players in the value chain. Based on 
these inputs, the flight operations engineering department create the pre-flight briefing 
and the flight release packages for the pilot. They will then monitor performance and 
make continuous improvements.  
5.2.5 Performance – Internal or Consultants 
Airlines continuously monitor and try to improve the performance of their 
operations. Today all aircraft on most major commercial airlines are equipped with 
devices that take detailed measurements of aircraft performance, fuel consumption, flight 
time, and flight path.  
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Most of the same firms that offer procedure design and charting act as consultants 
in this area. The idea is that the consulting firm can help improve the overall airline 
performance by analysing the data and improving the flight paths. There are also a large 
number of software solutions offered in this area.  
Performance Impact Comments 
Threat of 
New Entry 
High Cost of entry and entry barriers are low. Consulting firms 
enter and exit the market regularly. 
Power of 
Supplier 
N/A Airlines supply the data analyzed. 
Power of 
Buyer 
High Consultants must convince the airlines that they will provide 
efficiencies higher than the cost of hiring them.    
Threat of 
Substitutes 
High Airlines can do this internally.  
Existing 
Competitor 
Rivalry 
Medium Competition is mostly based on reputation rather than price.   
Table 5 - Performance - Porter's Five Forces Analysis (Porter, 2008) 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
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The implications of the competitive landscape are summarized in Figure 27Error! 
Reference source not found. below.  
 
Since aeronautical data and procedure design are provided in a very generic 
and non-accurate form by public agencies, the threat of substitutes is high while 
competition is very low. The challenge in entering the market in this sector, is to 
convince the airlines that they will experience substantial benefits by paying for data and 
procedures that are available publicly. As an oligopoly, charting enjoys very high 
margins, however, entry barriers are very high. The challenge in entering here is 
overcoming the airline’s switching cost in adopting a new graphical format and planning 
for the threat of large competitor response. Flight operations engineering activities are 
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Figure 27 - Competitive Landscape Implications 
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mostly internal airline activities and entering in this sector would mean providing tools or 
consulting services. Finally, performance evaluation and enhancement is basically a 
consulting market with some highly domain specific software tools available.  
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6:  PRODUCT STRATEGY 
This section looks at a hypothetical product and recommends product 
characteristics and marketing strategies for successful market penetration. Because of the 
strategic nature of this product as well as the limited scope of this paper, the product is 
only discussed in terms of the characteristics of what it offers to the customer rather than 
how it will do so.  
6.1 Marketing Mix 
The term “marketing mix” was first popularized by Borden in his article “The 
Concept of the Marketing Mix”. (Borden, 1984) While Borden’s marketing mix includes 
quite a few different ingredients, McCarthy later grouped these into four categories that 
are today known as the “4 Ps of Marketing” shown in Figure 28 below. (McCarthy, 1978) 
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Figure 28 - The 4 Ps of the Marketing Mix adapted from (McCarthy, 1978) 
This section describes each of these categories as well the positioning statement 
for the hypothetical product analyzed.  
6.1.1 Product 
“Company X” is offering “Product X” as a procedure design tool that would 
allow airline operators to design and modify operational flight procedures quickly and 
easily. The basic usage pattern is as follow. The airline operator can create a new or open 
an existing procedure using Product X and input parameters relating to the conditions at 
the time of flight. Based on these conditions Product X would re-evaluate the procedure, 
flag any safety concerns, and suggest efficiency improvements in the procedure. The 
Product
Pricing
Placement
Promotion
Target 
Market 
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operator would then respond to these concerns and suggestions to optimize the procedure 
for actual flight conditions.  
Once the operator is satisfied with the procedure, she will then proceed to chart it 
using Product X. Each airline operator will have one or multiple templates to use for 
charting purposes. Product X will create a suggested chart using one of the saved 
templates. The operator will then optimize the chart by adding, removing, and adjusting 
the size and location of elements on the chart. The idea is to allow the user to customize 
the chart without affecting the accuracy of the information displayed. As such, actual 
flight paths and location of physical objects will be drawn to scale by Product X and will 
not be editable by the operator. On the other hand, cosmetic features such as colour, font, 
and additional information displayed on the chart will be customizable.  
Note that Product X is not meant to replace the flight operations experts, but to 
give them more control. As such, Product X doesn’t create or optimize the procedure or 
chart. It does the calculations necessary for optimization and provides the tools and 
capabilities for the expert to perform the optimization and create the resulting chart.  
6.1.2 Positioning 
“Design and chart flight procedures the way you calculate fuel and take-off 
weight” 
In order to develop the positioning statement, it is necessary to understand the 
airline operator’s usage model prior and post Product X. Figure 29 below depicts how 
airlines typically interact with their flight procedures. 
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Figure 29 - Usage Pattern Prior to Product X 
Once the flight operations engineering department delivers the updated procedure 
to the chart provider, it takes an average of about 2 months before the updated chart is 
delivered to the pilot for operational flight. As a result, these procedures are created to be 
somewhat generic – they will be safe under a wide range of flight conditions. The buffers 
required to ensure this safety make these procedures less efficient than optimal.  
On the other hand, Figure 30 below depicts the usage pattern with Product X. 
Flight Ops 
Engineering
• The Flight Ops Engineering department identifies 
efficiency concern and builds / improves a flight 
procedure
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• The chart provider receives the optimized 
procedure and creates / updates the chart 
representing the procedure
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• The updated chart is delivered to the pilot for flight
• The chart has limited airline-specific customization 
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Figure 30 - Usage Pattern with Product X 
Using Product X, the airline operator can optimize the flight procedure hours 
before the flight, rather than requiring months. Now procedures can be adapted to the 
actually flight conditions and buffers can be safely reduced. This optimization increases 
airline safety, agility, and efficiency.  
This change in usage pattern is similar to how airlines have optimized the 
calculation of take-off weight and amount of fuel necessary. There was a time when 
airlines calculated the amount fuel necessary for each flight months prior to the scheduled 
flights. Since actual flight conditions were unknown at that time, the amount of fuel 
carried by each aircraft had to be high enough to cover the most pessimistic flight 
conditions in order to ensure safety. As airlines moved away from that model to adjusting 
calculations hours prior to flight based on actual flight conditions, they were able to 
Flight Ops 
Engineering
•Opens existing procedure in Product X
•Enters current conditions
•Optimizes procedure based on recomendations
•Generates templatized chart of procedure
•Customizes procedure chart and prints
Pilot
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create large efficiencies without compromising safety. Product X allows airline operators 
to experience efficiencies through a similar shift in flight procedure optimization.  
Therefore, the positioning statement for Product X is as follows.  
For airline operators who want to increase efficiency and agility in flight 
operations without compromising safety our product is a flight procedure design and 
charting tool that provides flight procedure experts the ability to optimize procedures 
and build customized flight charts unlike the traditional model of sending procedures to 
an external chart provider with a two months turn-around time we have assembled the 
tools necessary to allow internal flight operations experts to create, optimize, and 
customize flight charts within hours.  
6.1.3 Pricing 
Three pricing models were considered; one time licence, monthly subscription, 
pay-per-use. Of these three pricing models, the monthly subscription pricing model is 
recommended.  
From the customer’s perspective, the problem with the one-time-licence pricing 
model is that it creates a high up-front investment at the time of procurement when the 
actual returns to that specific operator are still unproven. The problem with the pay-per-
use model is that the actual cost becomes hard to predict. It becomes a problem from a 
budgeting and forecasting point of view.  
From Company X’s perspective, the problem with the one-time-licence pricing 
model is that it limits recurring revenue and the ability to offer value-added options. The 
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problem with the pay-per-use model is that it creates a disincentive for the customer to 
use the product and makes it harder to forecast revenues each month.   
The monthly-subscription pricing model lowers adoption barriers by decreasing 
the initial investment required by the airline operators. Costs and revenues are predictable 
from the perspective of both the customer and Company X. An option to cancel the 
subscription with a few months’ notice would minimize the risk of unfavourable returns 
for the airline operator and further remove adoption barriers. As Product X is enhanced 
with value added options over time, this pricing model allows trial pricing, bundling, and 
segment specific pricing.  
In terms of actual price range, Product X should be priced so that adopting 
airlines can experience positive returns in the same financial reporting period. This will 
promote further adoption of Product X, both in the airline that has adopted it and 
throughout the airline industry. Since actual prices should be based on expected returns 
from the increased efficiencies enabled by Product X, it is extremely hard to predict price 
ranges at this time and beyond the scope of this paper.  
6.1.4 Launch Strategy- Placement, Promotion, and the Role of Early Adopters 
The airline industry is characterised by inertia due to high fixed costs and 
interconnectivity of systems that necessitate standards, while at the same time remaining 
highly competitive. In such an environment, change is hard to initiate but when the value 
of a business case is demonstrated, adoption happens quickly. The key to successful 
product adoption revolves around reputation, relationships, and word of mouth. Company 
X must start by building a deep relationship with one or two major airlines in the 
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industry. The main goal at this stage is to demonstrate the business value of investing in 
Product X and to build a reputation around quality, safety, and responsiveness. The 
choice of early customer is important. They must be an early adopter who is also a 
credible reference for the majority market. 
When the first airline’s financial statements demonstrate the efficiencies gained 
through the adoption of Product X, there will be a large increase in demand for this type 
of product. It is important for Company X to be ready to grab as large a market share as 
possible early on. In order to do this, areas such as sales, production, support, and 
customer adoption must scale quickly.  It will be the slowest link in the overall demand 
generation and fulfilment chain that will determine Company X’s overall market share 
and its ability to be the market leader.  
In terms of controlling variable cost and speed of delivery, Product X should be 
designed to allow each airline to easily customize charts themselves with little 
involvement from Company X. This can be done by adopting a “mass customization” 
strategy where desired chart elements are created as independent modules that can be 
easily added, removed, or cosmetically customized by the airline operator experts. In this 
case, an additional customer at-most requires the addition of “new modules” and with 
each new customer the likelihood of such request decreases. Such strategy creates 
economies of learning where the variable cost of additional customers decreases over 
time and entry barriers are elevated for would-be competitors. 
Furthermore, Company X can prepare to meet market demand through a highly 
scalable back-end design and a streamlined product adoption process. By the time the 
efficiency gains of Product X are proven, Company X should have developed a process 
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for the smooth transition of an airline’s existing procedures into Product X. This process 
should document, not only internal activities within Company X, but also the activities 
and operational changes necessary at the airline operator in order to experience the 
efficiencies from Product X.  
6.2 Market Penetration 
There are two dimensions for segmenting the market to increase adoption rate; 
procedure type and type of airline. In terms of procedure type, Company X should first 
focus on areas with the lowest barriers of adoption and the highest returns. As depicted in 
Figure 31 below, the focus should first be safety procedures such as one-engine out, then 
departure procedures -- leaving en-route and approach procedures for the very end.  
 
 
In the above diagram, an airline’s cost of adoption is based on three factors; 
existing in-house expertise, necessary regulatory and air traffic controller cooperation, 
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and current airline operations. In terms of in-house expertise, airlines use mostly public 
approach and en-route procedures, some tailored departure procedures at “problem 
airports”, and almost all tailored safety procedures such as one-engine out procedures. As 
a result, airlines have the highest level of in-house expertise in safety procedure 
development and some expertise is developing departure procedures.  
Furthermore, development, optimization, and operational use of safety procedures 
require the least amount of involvement from regulators and air traffic controllers. 
Departure procedures require regulatory approval but little involvement from air traffic 
controllers. On the other hand, approach procedures require both regulatory approval and 
air traffic controller authorization.  
Finally, airlines don’t usually have safety procedures formally charted by their 
charting company. In most cases, they print a basic version themselves and provide it to 
the pilot. As a result, such procedures would require the least amount of process and 
behavioural change from the airline.  
Based on these three factors of in-house expertise, third party involvement, and 
existing airline operations, airlines will experience the lowest cost of adoption with safety 
procedures and then departure procedures. Other procedure types such as approach and 
en-route procedures will experience the highest cost of adoption.   
The return experienced from each procedure type is based on the airline’s ability 
to create operational efficiencies by adapting that procedure type to actual flight 
conditions. Safety procedures are used to calculate the limits of aircraft performance. 
These procedures dictate the maximum take-off weight and the amount of fuel to be 
carried by the aircraft at the time of flight. Since these are some of the most important 
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factors in aircraft performance and operational efficiency, returns from safety procedure 
optimization are likely to be the highest. On the other hand, since the highest rate by far 
of fuel burn is at take-off and during climbing, optimizing departure procedures is also 
likely to provide larger efficiencies and higher returns than optimizing approach and en-
route procedures.  
The second dimension of market segmentation is the type of airline. As discussed 
in the Conclusion subsection of section 4:  Flight Operations Engineering Market, airlines 
should be segmented first based on operational maturity, then the airline’s structure and 
culture, and finally based on the type of operations and geography. Airlines with mature 
operations are more likely to spend resources improving efficiencies in flight operations 
engineering. The airlines’ structure and culture will dictate how easily they can change 
internal processes to create efficiencies based on the capabilities offered by Product X. 
The type of operations (regional, long-haul, etc) and geographical location will dictate the 
extent of the impact that such localized efficiencies will have on overall airline costs.  
When the market is segmented based on the two dimensions of procedure type 
and type of airline, a bowling pin market penetration model (Moore, 2002) can be 
developed as demonstrated in Figure 32 below.  
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As Company X develops a deeper relationship with its initial customers, it can 
sell deeper within that company by promoting the adoption of Product X for additional 
procedure types. Furthermore, as the efficiency gains from the adoption of each 
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Figure 32 - Market Penetration Strategy 
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procedure type is proven, Company X can increase the breath of its customers by 
expanding customer types as illustrated in Figure 32 above. In this way, each successful 
product feature creates an opportunity to engage a new customer, and each success 
customer relationship creates an opportunity for deeper sales.  
6.3 Business Model Disruption 
Current charting solutions are evaluated on the dimensions of perceived quality 
and cost. Perceived quality is based not only on the quality of the information provided, 
but also the relevancy of the information presented to the airline’s operations, the 
depiction of that information, the ease-of-use in reading it, and the extent to which the 
depiction has become an industry standard. The cost of the charting solution takes into 
account the overall cost to the airline, which includes not only the cost of acquiring the 
charts, but also the cost of maintenance and renewal.  
Product X offers airlines new dimensions of responsiveness, agility, and control 
in procedure development and charting that existing offerings are unable to provide. By 
changing turn-around time from months to hours, it allows airlines to use in-house 
expertise to tailor procedures to daily flight conditions. On the other hand, as a new 
player in this market, Product X will not compare well on the existing dimensions of 
valuation. While the new dimensions offered by Product X allows airline operators to 
create efficiencies in flight operations, the lack of the value added services currently 
offered by existing charting companies can be a significant draw back.  
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With respect the Christensen’s disruptive technology model introduced in section 
2.2, Figure 34 below illustrates the current market conditions and Product X’s possible 
trajectory.  
 
 If we consider charting as the overall market, then the mainstream market is 
currently interested in charting public procedures. Existing players such as Jeppesen and 
Lido are moving higher in the market by providing value-added services such as the 
delivery and replacement of charts on board operational aircrafts and minor 
customization of charts. However, current providers are not satisfying the market for 
truly tailored procedures such as safety procedures. Airlines tend to create crude versions 
of these charts (often no more than a set of instructions) and provide that to the pilots.  
In this model, Product X has the potential to disrupt this market by entering at the 
lower end of the market to satisfy the needs related to charting safety procedures. Since 
Time 
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Figure 33 – Product X’s Possible Disruption Trajectory (Christensen, 1997) 
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these procedures are not usually formally charted, Product X will not be taking market 
share away from existing players – at least not at first. Since the market is small, large 
competitors are not likely to be interested or threatened. As the charting capabilities of 
Product X improves over time, airlines are more likely to use it for other charting needs, 
especially if they are already using it in-house. Furthermore, as airlines experience the 
value of the agility and control offered by Product X, they are more likely to value these 
criteria in all their charting needs.  In this way, Product X begins to move upstream and 
disrupt the mainstream market.   
Next, if we look at Product X from the Blue Ocean Strategy introduced in section 
2.3, we can compare Product X’s value curve to that of existing offerings as shown in 
Figure 34.  
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As demonstrated, Product X offers quite a different value profile than existing 
competitors. Product X is attempting to create a new market for airlines that want agility, 
control, and responsiveness. One of the main differences of this value profile is the 
placement of expertise. With existing competitors, the charting expertise resides with the 
service provider and the chart provided is a result of that expertise. With Product X 
however, all the expertise resides with the airline operators. Product X provides the tools 
to create, update, and analyze procedures and charts, but assumes that the user will have 
the expertise of how to create and optimize such procedures. It is a “do it yourself” model 
that provides the airline independence from third party providers.  
The main problem with Product X’s strategy is how to protect market share and 
secure a dominant position once this business model is proven. The best option is to 
create entry barriers for new entrants. Company X can attempt to create entry barriers 
through economies of learning and network effects. Economies of learning can be created 
by implementing a feedback loop that constantly collects information about usage 
patterns and improves Product X’s value. This is discussed in more details in section 6.5 
Product Development. Network effects will be harder to create. One way of creating 
network effects is for Company X to use its growing customer base to increase its 
negotiating power with regulators. For example, a feature that would allow airlines to 
submit procedures for regulatory approval directly through Product X and reduce the 
turn-around time for such approvals will greatly increase the value of Product X and 
create entry barriers for new entrants.  
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6.4 Competitive Analysis 
While the previous section mentioned why existing competitors are not likely to 
be threatened by Product X’s entry in the market, this section analyzes their ability to 
respond and compete with Product X. The main problem for existing competitors is that 
Product X’s differing business model requires quite different capabilities. Company X’s 
competency lies in developing software tools while existing competitor’s competencies 
revolve around their expertise in building charts.  
Figure 35 below illustrates the dimensions of a company’s core capabilities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1995).  
 
Figure 35 - Dimensions of Core Capability adapted from (Leonard-Barton, 1995) 
In order to compete based on a different expertise, existing competitors will have 
to, at the very least, change the domain of their skills and knowledge. Furthermore, in 
order to be successful in this new business model, they will likely have to change the 
Culture 
& Values
Skills & 
Knowledge
Managerial 
Systems
Physical 
Systems
  
80 
basis of their value system to value software development skills at least as much as 
domain knowledge, their managerial systems to grow and promote the new skill sets 
required, and their physical systems to accommodate such change.  
Adapting to compete within Product X’s new business model would require 
existing competitors to change at every level of current operations, forcing them to 
redefine what they are good at and what they value. This depth of change is extremely 
difficult to achieve and the unlikely cases of success usually take a long time.  
6.5 Product Development 
Based on the analysis of the previous sections, this business venture has four main 
characteristics that must be satisfied when planning for the development of Product X. 
These are: 
1. New Market: as described previously, Product X is attempting to create and grow 
a new market with a different business model. Product development must 
recognize that the definition of its target market and the identification of the 
characteristics of this market are merely assumption and should be continuously 
monitored. It is important to be prepared to react and adjust quickly. 
2. New Product Type: means that the usage model of Product X is unknown. One of 
the largest assumptions that product development will make is to decide which 
features of Product X will be most useful and in what order the user will want to 
operate the system.  
3. Scale and Variable Cost: given the disruptive strategy, Product X’s customer size 
is likely to grow rapidly. It is therefore important to build the product in such a 
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way as to scale seamlessly and decrease the variable cost of additional customers. 
This will allow Product X to meet market demand while ensuring good profit 
margins.  
4. Create Economies of Learning: in order to create entry barriers against potential 
new competitors, the development of Product X should create a large learning 
curve for new entrants by continuously improving Product  X based on knowledge 
gained from experience.  
To satisfy the above four characteristics, Product X’s architecture should be 
highly scalable, modular, and contain a feedback loop that monitors and reports usage 
patterns. A scalable nature would accommodate fast growth in the number of customer 
and allow Company X to meet the demands of a growing market. A modular architecture 
would allow features to be added and modified independently; allowing Product X to 
implement knowledge gained from the market quickly and be more responsive. A 
feedback loop would allow Company X to learn from its existing customer base in a non-
intrusive manner.  
Furthermore, an overall product map can be used to prioritize future features as 
market knowledge is gained. Small and iterative release cycles would allow Product X to 
test assumptions, learn from its customers quickly and respond to the market needs using 
a probe and learn strategy of product development. 
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7:  CONCLUSION 
This section provides a summary of the findings of this paper and suggestions on 
future work.  
7.1 Summary 
Today’s global airline industry suffers from excess capacity. Furthermore, their 
main stream consumers see the products offerings as relatively undifferentiated. As a 
result, the dominant competing criteria for its consumers is price. Additionally, ticket 
pricing can, in some cases, be well below operational cost, not only because of excess 
capacity, but also because airline tickets are non-durable goods and the marginal cost of 
filling an additional seat is close to zero. The eventual result is an extremely competitive 
environment.  Aggravated by the rising cost of jet fuel, the global airline industry is 
suffering from extremely low returns. In fact, in the past decade, almost all airlines have 
experienced negative returns, not even being able to cover their cost of operation. This 
has resulted in bankruptcies and consolidations as exemplified by the KLM and Air 
France merger or the United Airlines and Delta merger.  
Since this competitive environment is fairly consistent across geographic regions 
and type of operations, it is rarely possible for an airline to improve returns by growing 
its market through increased product offerings related to routes or destination. Since 
expansion will probably result in larger negative returns, airlines must focus on 
improving returns by reducing the cost of operations. Since most initiatives that result in 
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efficiency gains are relatively easy to emulate, competitive advantages gained through 
reducing cost are short lived. On the other hand, in such a cost competitive environment, 
airlines that are not constantly improving their operational efficiency will no longer be a 
going concern. Therefore, a new product or service that can provide operational 
efficiencies to airlines is likely to experience very high adoption rates once the returns 
have been proven.   
Airlines can increase efficiency in many aspects of their operations including 
scheduling and labour costs. In terms of technology based product innovation, the one 
area of airline operations that is most likely to experience the most benefit from improved 
technological capabilities is the flight operations engineering department within airlines. 
With the business objectives of “first safety, then efficiency”, this department focuses on 
three main types of activities. First, they measure the performance of flight operations at 
an extremely granular level, in most cases, recording over 40 parameters for each flight. 
The reason is that the improved accuracy and granularity of what is monitored provides 
the ability to reduce safety buffers allowing improved operational efficiencies without 
sacrificing safety. Second, the flight operations engineering groups is constantly 
optimizing and adjusting daily operations based on the implications of the changes in the 
parameters they monitor. The third set of activities revolves around planning and 
implementing initiatives to increase operational safety and efficiency.   
In order to perform these ongoing activities, the flight operations engineering 
department relies on external vendors. Figure 36 below illustrates this market’s value 
chain together with its implications as described in the industry analysis section.  
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As illustrated in the above figure, aeronautical data and procedure design is 
usually provided by public agencies and regulatory bodies. Airlines use this public data 
the majority of the time. However, when the flight operations engineering department 
deems that efficiencies can be gained by tailoring the specific flight procedure, the 
activities involved in doing so are mostly done internally within the department.  
Pilots use charts to fly intended procedures. Globally, charting is currently a 
duopoly with Jeppesen and Lido owning over 90% of the market in commercial aviation. 
At a regional level, Jeppesen holds a geographical monopoly in North America, and Lido 
a geographical monopoly in Europe.  
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Figure 36 - Value Chain Implications 
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Under these market conditions, Product X has the potential to disrupt the market 
for charting procedures by competing based on a different business model. Rather than 
owning the charting expertise and selling finished charts, Product X allows airline 
operators to use in-house expertise to build and publish the charts themselves. This new 
business model not only lowers the airline’s charting costs but also offers much shorter 
turn-around time. The decrease in the time required to update and publish new charts 
provides operators with the ability to tailor procedures to actual flight conditions and 
thereby reduce the need for safety buffers and increase operational efficiency.  
7.2 Future Work 
This paper is strategic in nature and attempts to offer neither tactical nor 
operational recommendations. Some of the next steps to building Product X are: 
• An analysis of the actual competencies of Company X compared to the 
competencies required to build and deliver Product X. The gaps should be 
identified and recommendations should be provided. 
• A business case analysis of the order of magnitude of the cost and resource 
requirements for this business venture compared to the potential returns   
• A technical solution and prototype of Product X 
• Implementation and delivery plans complete with schedule and resource 
allocation 
  
86 
APPENDICES 
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APPENDIX 1: HUB AND SPOKE NETWORK 
Prior to deregulation carriers were assigned linear routes, usually with 
intermediate stops. Post deregulation, specific airports were designated as “Hubs”. As a 
result, airlines are able to increase capacity utilization since any specific flight is now 
serving not only passengers with that destination, but also passengers with connecting 
destinations. Lastly, this model allows airlines to further increase their product range by 
forming partnerships with other airlines that service different “spokes” from the same 
“Hub”. This new system of hub and spokes has increased capacity usage and decreased 
airlines’ costs. As expected, the competitive nature of deregulation lowered ticket prices, 
which combined with economic growth and increased consumer affluence to produce in 
large increases in air traffic.  
However, since airspace capacity at “Hub” airports is limited, a major side effect 
of increased air traffic has been congestion at these airports. Furthermore, since this Hub 
and Spoke system is highly connected, problems at one “Hub” airport can have large 
repercussions through the whole system.  As air traffic is diverted from one busy Hub 
airport to another, the problem ripples throughout the whole system. A good example of 
this problem is the April 2010 Iceland volcanic activity that severely affected air traffic 
through Heathrow Airport (London, England) and practically crippled global air travel 
(Queensland Newspapers, 2010).  
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APPENDIX 2: ICELAND VOLCANO ASH CLOUD 
CHOKES GLOBAL AIR TRAVEL (QUEENSLAND 
NEWSPAPERS, 2010) 
The Courier-Mail – April 16 2010 8:25 pm –  
THOUSANDS of Queenslanders have been stranded at airports around the world 
or had their holiday plans thrown into chaos as the impact of a volcanic eruption in 
Iceland spreads across the globe.  
Major Asian hubs including Singapore and Bangkok have been swamped with stranded 
travellers after the cancellation of connecting flights in the biggest shutdown of airspace 
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Qantas cancelled all five flights to Heathrow on Friday and one to Frankfurt, leaving 
more than 1000 people uncertain as to when they could start their European voyage. 
A further 1000 passengers were stuck in Singapore, and about 350 each in Hong Kong 
and Bangkok as people heading to Europe found their connecting flights had been 
cancelled. They are likely to be stuck there in transit for several nights. 
Qantas group executive David Epstein said most European airports were likely to be 
closed at least until Sunday. 
Qantas has five flights a day to Europe, which means a further 2000 people could be 
affected by flight closures out of Australia this weekend. 
Singapore Airlines' public relations manager Susan Bredow said passengers with onward 
connections to Europe should stay at home rather than head to the airport. 
"The concern about people going up to Singapore is that, from what we understand, 
Singapore hotels are pretty much at capacity," she said. 
"Until we get some sort of clarity as to when those airports are going to open again, we 
don't want people just to go off and not to complete their journey." 
Scientists have warned that Wednesday's eruption at the Eyjafjallajokull glacier could be 
a preview for a series of eruptions, with more magma being jetted into the air refuelling 
the cloud. The last time this volcano erupted, in 1821, it lasted two years. 
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New Scientist editor Roger Highfield said of the spewing cloud: "It could be hours or 
days, perhaps months or even longer." 
Singapore Airlines also cancelled seven flights, including two from Singapore to London, 
with 2200 passengers affected, although none of its flights leaving Australia were 
cancelled. 
Other airlines to have cancelled flights include Malaysian Airlines, Emirates and Cathay 
Pacific. Passengers have been told to check with their airline's website before heading to 
the airport. 
The 10km-high plume of ash has affected millions of air travellers, with much of Europe 
shutting its airports. The number of flights cancelled worldwide is about 6000. 
Countries that shut all their airports include Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Belgium. Germany and France closed some of their major airports. 
But there was some cheer for travellers as Sweden tonight  began to gradually reopen its 
airspace and UK authorities allowed some domestic and North Atlantic flights to and 
from Northern Ireland and some parts of Scotland. 
Professor Richard Arculus, a volcanologist from the Australian National University, said 
ash was a particular hazard to aircraft as was discovered in 1982 when a British Airways 
747 flew into a plume from Galunggung volcano in Java. 
All four engines failed, and pilot Captain Eric Moody had to glide the plane for 14 
minutes before he could restart them. 
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APPENDIX 3: AIRLINE STRUCTURE 
Air Canada (Cogmap, 2009) 
From Air Canada’s organizational chart the following deduction can be made 
about their organizational and functional structure.  
CEO 
 Executive VP & COO (Operations) 
 Executive VP & Chief Commercial Officer (Sales & Marketing) 
 Senior VP, E-Commerce, & CIO (Reservations & Ticketing) 
 Senior VP Employee Relations (HR – Administrative) 
 Executive VP &  CFO (Finance – Administrative) 
 VP & General Counsel (Legal – Administrative) 
 VP Corporate Communications (PR – Administrative) 
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APPENDIX 4: US AIRLINE DATA 2000-2008 
Operating Income (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009) 
Airline 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AMR Corp 1,381 -2,470 -3,330 -844 -134 -89 1,060 965 -1,889 
Continental 
Airlines Inc 
729 144 -330 188 -238 -39 468 687 -314 
Delta Air 
Lines Inc 
1,637 -1,602 -1,309 -785 -
3,308 
-
2,001 
58 1,096 -8,314 
Northwest 
Airlines 
Corp 
569 -868 -846 -265 -505 -919 740 1,104 -5,564 
UAL Corp 654 -3,771 -2,837 -1,360 -854 -219 447 1,037 -4,438 
US Airways 
Group Inc I 
-53 -1,683 -1,317 -251 -378 - - - - 
US Airways 
Group Inc II 
- - - - - - 558 533 -1,800 
America 
West 
Holdings 
Corp 
-13 -411 -159 22 -44 - - - - 
Total 
Network  
4,904 -
10,661 
-
10,128 
-3,295 -
5,461 
-
3,267 
3,331 5,422 -
22,319 
Average 
700.6 -1523 
-
1446.9 -470.7 
-
780.1 
-
653.4 555.2 903.7 
-
3719.8 
          
Southwest 
Airlines Co   
1,022 631 341 379 404 725 934 791 449 
JetBlue 
Airways 
Corp  
-21 27 105 167 111 48 127 169 109 
AirTran 
Holdings 
Inc  
81 7 31 86 30 23 41 138 72 
Frontier 
Airlines 
Holdings 
Inc  
81 16 -31 27 -26 -8 -10 -35 -47 
Total Low 
Cost 
1,163 681 446 660 518 788 1,092 1,063 583 
  
92 
Carriers   
          
Alaska Air 
Group Inc   
-33 -126 -93 -18 6 167 -87 212 -129 
Hawaiian 
Holdings 
Inc  
-14 17 -56 -15 -7 2 1 7 92 
Midwest 
Air Group 
Inc  
7 -38 -54 -30 -45 -65 1 - - 
Total Other  -40 -148 -204 -63 -47 103 -86 219 -37 
          
Total  6,027 -
10,128 
-9,886 -2,698 -
4,990 
-
2,376 
4,337 6,704 -
21,773 
Average 
430.5 -723.4 -706.1 -192.7 
-
356.4 -198 333.6 558.7 
-
1814.4 
 
 
  
93 
APPENDIX 4: HISTORIC PRICE OF JET FUEL (UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 
FEDERAL STATISTICS, 2010) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Average $0.94 $0.77 $0.73 $0.88 $1.28 $1.75 $2.03 $2.21 $2.32 $1.71
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$0.00
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APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEWS 
Interview Methodology 
The purpose of the interviews performed for this project is to gather current 
market and industry information. The goal was not necessarily to achieve accuracy in the 
data collected but to gain a better general understanding of the industry and to confirm 
assumptions. For this reason, two decisions were made. First, interviewees were picked 
from different sections of the value chain as well as a wide range of geographical 
locations. Second, the interview questions were purposefully designed to be very open 
ended and generic. The idea was to remove any assumptions from the questions and not 
to lead the interviewee in any way. A few more specific interview questions were created, 
but those were only asked if the interviewee approached that specific subject themselves. 
The interview questions are listed in the next section.  
The interviewees for this project were kind enough to offer their time and agree to 
be interviewed. However, these interviews were not officially authorized by the company 
that the interviewee works at, and therefore, the opinions expressed during the interviews 
were solely those of the interviewee and not necessarily representative of the company. 
Furthermore, due to the informal nature of these interviews, interviewees specifically 
requested not to be directly quoted. In order to accommodate this request and to ensure 
that comments are not misused, misrepresented, or taken out of context, the result of 
these interviews are presented only in aggregate form.  
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The remainder of this appendix lists the interview questions, the interviewees, and 
the aggregated result of the interviews.  
Interview Questions 
Three main goals were identified for the interview activity: 
1. Understand how operational efficiency is measured 
2. Identify current pain points 
3. Understand the decision process 
Interview questions were designed to guide the conversation towards the above 
topics without leading the interviewee to any specific answer or conclusion. In very 
general terms, interviews were structured in the following way: 
Introduction 
Since the interviewees had little previous knowledge of the interviewer, the 
interview always started with a short summary of this project, and the purpose of the 
interviews. The interviews were thanked for them time, and assured that they would not 
be individually quoted. 
Measure 
The interviewees were asked, in their opinions, what are the business objectives 
of the flight operations engineering department of airlines. Based on their answers, the 
next questions would ask how these objectives are measured, tracked, and reported.  
Pain Points 
Next, the interviewees were asked, in their opinions what were the biggest 
impediments in achieving the above business objectives. When problems were identified, 
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interviewees were then asked why they thought the problem existed, and what would 
have to change for the problem to be removed or improved. Finally, the interviewee 
would be asked what changes they see happening and what they would change, if they 
could.  
It should be noted that while most interviewees were happy to answer these 
questions about the industry in general, many refused to approach the topic of their 
current position or current company.  
Decision Process 
It was decided that the best way to identify decision processes was by asking 
interviewees to tell the story of existing experiences. First, the interviewee was asked to 
identify major changes in the past that attempted to provide operational efficiencies and 
that have either succeeded or failed to do so. When the scenarios were identified, the 
interviewee was asked to start at the beginning and describe how, when, and by whom 
the potential change was identified, how the decision was made to implement the change, 
how long the overall process took, and how was success or failure defined and measured.  
Areas of Interest 
While the above sections were covered in every interview, a few areas and 
questions that are more specific were identified and only asked if the interviewee 
approached the subject themselves or if there was enough time left. These were as 
follows. 
• Extent and cost of use of non-public procedures 
o Where do you use them 
o What % of overall procedures 
o Why did you start creating them 
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o What benefits are you getting from them 
o How did you build them and who owns them 
o Where did you get your obstacle and terrain data 
o What is the cost associated with building them 
o Why do you not use them more often 
o How do you cyclically review and maintain them 
• Charting 
o What is the budget / cost of charting 
o What do you need to chart 
o Who do you use for charting and why 
o What is the cost involved in switching 
Interviewees 
Person Position Company Country Date Duration 
Mr. Paul-
Franck Bijou CEO 
Quovadis 
(Airbus 
Subsidiary) 
France 
June 08 
2010 40 min 
Mr. Arvid 
Von 
Nordenflyght 
Pilot 
(Retired) 
United 
Airlines USA 
June 09 
2010 1 h 10 min 
Mr. Alan 
Marshall 
Pilot WestJet Airlines Canada 
June 15 
2010 45 min 
Mr. Jim 
Hartman 
Flight Ops 
Engineer 
Delta 
Airlines USA 
June 16 
2010 35 min 
Mr. Scott 
Wilson 
Director 
Flight 
Standards 
WestJet 
Airlines Canada 
June 24 
2010 55 min 
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Mr. Brian 
Gleason 
Director, 
Flight 
Operations 
Engineering 
SouthWest 
Airlines USA 
June 29 
2010 1 hr 
Interview Results 
The overall results of the interviews were divided into the following sections: 
Areas of Concern 
 Ticket Pricing and Sales 
Competition 
Interconnectedness and Natural Catastrophes 
Operating Efficiencies 
Flight Operations Engineering Objectives 
Measuring Efficiencies 
Airline Structure 
 Unions and Culture 
 Pilot and Dispatcher Relationship 
 Aircraft Types and Policies 
Decision Process 
Change Process 
Hedging 
Fuel 
 Factors affecting Fuel Burn 
Politics and Government Programs 
 Tax Programs 
 RNP / PBN - NextGen (FAA – US) / SESAR (EuroControl – Europe) 
 Local Standards 
Route Optimization and Tailored Procedures 
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These sections are covered below.  
Areas of Concern 
When asked about the main problems or concerns within the aviation industry, the 
answers covered the following topics.  
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Ticket Pricing and Sales 
One of the main problems mentioned for airlines in general is setting the selling 
price of tickets. The concern, of course, is that airline seats are not durable goods and the 
marginal cost of an additional passenger is close to zero. So the concern is: at what point 
does an airline start to cut prices for a specific flight?  
However, since this area is somewhat unrelated to this project, the topic was not 
investigated in any further depth.  
Competition 
In general, the airline industry suffers from excess capacity with price being the 
primary differentiating factor for its main consumer base.  This results in little room to 
growth, fierce competition within existing market, undercutting, and price wars. An 
example that was given is that for many years United Airlines was flying New Zealand to 
Los Angeles. However, they gave that up after a few years because they were unable to 
generate any profits. The reason given was that Qantas and Air New Zealand started a 
price war upon United’s entry into that route, and maintained low prices until United 
exited.  
Another point of interest about the nature of competition within the airline 
industry is that the legacy carriers tend to fly the long-haul routes where they can 
generate the highest profits and smaller carriers cover the shorter routes. However, 
smaller carriers that cover those routes are not necessarily generating profits from ticket 
sales. Rather, the larger carriers pay them on a per-leg (per-flight) basis, regardless of the 
number of passengers, just to maintain service to the smaller cities.  
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Interconnectedness and Natural Catastrophes 
As the number of interconnections between different areas of the world increases, 
a single natural catastrophe in one part of the world can affect airlines throughout the 
globe. Some of the examples that were specifically discussed were the Iceland volcano 
that blocked airline operations in Europe for many weeks and the earthquake in Chile 
earlier this year. Because of these catastrophes, some airline operations such as flights, 
aircraft deliveries and flight operation projects had to be cancelled or postponed resulting 
in large financial losses, delays, and inconvenience.  
To understand the extent of the damages to the airlines one must compare actual 
operational losses to airline margins. An airline may only have a small number of flights 
through a specific region, or a small number of flights that are affected by the event, say 
5%. However, that’s 5% of operating revenue that will be taken away straight from the 
bottom line of what little profit margins currently exist or don’t exist in the airline 
industry.  
Furthermore, safety concerns that are so prevalent in the airline industry can 
aggravate the situation. For example, the European “protection principle” was mentioned 
which implies that regulators must take appropriate measures to protect the public against 
any foreseeable risk. As a result, in the case of natural catastrophe, regulators stop all 
commercial airline traffic, not necessarily because it is actually unsafe, but because they 
don’t know whether it is safe or not. Such requirements for safety and protection delay 
normal operations further and increase the financial losses.  
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Operating Efficiencies  
In almost all interviews, when discussing efficiencies in flight operations 
engineering, at some point or other, the discussion came back to operational efficiencies 
in general. The basic understanding is that within an industry of extreme low margins that 
is subject to a high level of risk from external factors such as currency and fuel 
fluctuations, global economy, weather patterns, and natural disasters; the only way to 
survive is through extremely efficient flight operations engineering operations. At the end 
of the day, one must understand that is only one part of overall airline operations and 
efficiencies must be gained throughout an airline’s operations.  
When looking at increasing efficiencies, airlines should focus efforts on the parts 
of their operations that are most inefficient. The two main factors in identifying areas of 
focus are maturity of airline operations and overall airline structure. Immature operations 
can create the largest efficiencies by focusing on areas such as scheduling and crew 
planning. On the other hand, highly unionized and hierarchical airlines can find 
efficiencies by improving employee relations and their ability to be flexible and 
responsive to changing market conditions.  
In terms of scheduling, as one interviewee said “if you can get 18 hours a day out 
of your fleet instead of 11 hours, I think that makes fairly straight forward sense”. The 
problem, of course, is to balance the desire to increase flight time with the demands of the 
market and the limitations of changing time zones. On long flights, airlines must juggle 
time zones, daylight windows that have higher market demand, and general weather 
conditions such as wind direction. In general, optimizing schedule to increase flight time 
can generate incremental efficiencies.   
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Another source of operating efficiency is employee relationships and internal 
programs. Improved employee relations not only provide savings in cost of labour but 
reduce requirements in redundancy in body count. For example, one airline was able to 
completely remove extra pilot and flight attendant body counts by implementing a culture 
of voluntary (paid) overtime to cover sick days and time offs. Internal training programs 
and facilities can decrease the cost of training as well as provide savings on travel days. 
However, such programs usually require upfront capital expenditure and investment in 
internal competencies.  
Another example given by an interviewer is as follows. Depending on an airline’s 
operations, let’s say that fuel cost is about 12% of overall operating cost and crew cost is 
about 15% for short haul carriers and 8% for long haul carriers. Now, that airline operator 
can put in place a fuel initiative that will 1 to 3% of annual fuel cost, which is quite large. 
However, when you look at that airline’s operations you find that they don’t have the 
correct mix of captains and co-pilots, so that they have daily problems creating the right 
combination of one captain, one co-pilot, and one aircraft type. As a result they have to 
cancel flights because they can’t manage their crew properly and the reality of crew cost 
is much higher than fuel cost. In this case the airline can experience 5% efficiency within 
3 months with much lower expenditure than any fuel initiative can provide.  
Flight Operations Engineering Objectives 
In terms of objectives, flight operations engineering’s primary focus is airline 
safety, and then, efficiency without compromising safety. In order to create efficiencies 
within the airline industry, this department must also overcome the challenges associated 
with working within such a highly regulated environment.  
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In order to generate efficiencies without compromising safety, one of the primary 
jobs of this department is to understand the maximum performance of a given aircraft at a 
given airport. To understand the maximum as well as optimum aircraft performance, the 
aircraft’s flight manual is used.  
It would seem that this department focuses mainly on what they consider 
“performance challenged airports”. Four major characteristics of an airport are 
considered: runway length, altitude, temperature, and terrain. Airports that have a 
combination of shorter runways, higher altitudes, warmer temperatures, and high terrain 
(for example mountainous areas) require higher performance capabilities from the 
aircraft. One of the main objectives of the flight operations engineering department is 
first to guarantee safety of flight at such airports, but also to generate efficiencies in such 
environments. Some of the tools used include matching aircraft types to specific airports 
and routes, monitoring aircraft performance, calculating takeoff weights close to real 
time, monitoring fuel burn data, and tailoring flight procedures and flight paths. Other 
aspects of efficiency include studies to investigate how efficiencies can be better 
measured, managed, and reproduced consistently. In terms of safety, this department is 
also responsible for the contents of navigational charts and databases used by the flight 
management system on board of the aircraft.  
When asked about changes in the industry in general that would help create 
efficiencies, the largest leaps in efficiency are expected to come from aircraft 
manufacturers. The next generation Boeing 787 aircrafts, for example, are expected to 
provide a very large leap in performance in terms of fuel burn.  
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Measuring Efficiencies 
The ability to measure performance seems to be one of the major challenges of 
the flight operations engineering department. There are two main goals in increasing the 
granularity of measurements. First being able to consistently understand the largest 
factors affecting daily operations allows airlines to focus efforts and prioritize activities. 
Second, the ability to measure the effect of changes better allows airlines to build 
stronger business cases, understand expected returns on specific investments with better 
accuracy, reduce risk and increase predictability.  
On any single flight, there are a lot of factors affecting fuel burn such as wind, 
temperature, barometric pressure, weather patterns, aircraft weight, drag, flight path, air 
traffic controller instructions, pilot decisions, and so on. (see section Factors affecting 
Fuel Burn). Today, most modern airlines have an ACMS (Aircraft Monitoring System) 
function that automatically records 40 parameters or more on every flight and allows that 
information to be downloaded to a main database upon landing. This information is very 
detailed and specific.  
When the above information is used to monitor a specific aircraft (referred to as 
“monitoring per tail number”), this information is very useful in providing two types of 
information. First, it can provide near real time information on issues that could be a 
safety concern. One interviewer, for example, described a case where an airplane was 
grounded minutes before its scheduled flight because of concerns that the engine might 
die during the flight. While such situations are rare, a more common use of this data is to 
monitor the rate of performance degradation of each aircraft. Using data gathered over 
the span of about one month, the flight operations engineering department can not only 
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decide when to schedule specific aircrafts for maintenance, but also decide how much 
extra fuel should be carried on a per tail number basis rather than per aircraft type in 
general. In this way, this level of granularity is used to increase safety and efficiency 
simultaneously.  
On the other hand, at the aggregate level, airlines would like to be able to 
determine actual value generated by specific investments or initiative and to derive 
patterns that can guide future spending and efforts. However, there are major challenges 
in using this data at an aggregate level. When asked about what is measured and 
monitored at the aggregate level, common answers included looking at the overall fuel 
burn from last year, adapting it for major changes such as new destination, and 
comparing it to this year’s fuel bill. Almost all interviewer expressed that looking at the 
data at any other level of granularity could be misleading.  
The main reason quoted for this limitation was that there are simply too many 
parameters and too many variables creating too much noise to be able to detect the 
pattern in the data.  
Airline Structure 
One of the major factors affecting an airlines profits in terms of its ability to 
generate efficiencies, adapt to changing environment, and general responsiveness is the 
internal structure of the airline. In terms of airline structure, three main areas of interest 
were identified; Unions and culture, pilot/dispatcher relationship, policies regarding 
aircraft types and pilots.  Each of these areas is discussed further in the following 
sections.  
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Unions and Culture  
The structure of an airline in terms of it unions, it’s hierarchical structure, and its 
general culture can have major affects in the airlines’ ability to generate efficiencies. First 
change seemed to be hardest to implement in highly unionized and hierarchical airlines. 
When asked about the change process and timeline, interviewers from large unionized 
airlines would describe a change in terms of many years (for example 7 years), whereas 
similar changes in smaller non-unionized airline was described in terms of months (about 
12 or so).  
The second major difference was the airline’s desire to experiment. Smaller non-
unionized airlines prided themselves in giving examples of all the different things they 
tried and all the little ways they were able to generate small amounts of efficiencies. 
Larger, unionized airlines, on the other hand, prided themselves in the fact that changes 
were done after proper due diligence and after everyone affected had a chance to be 
heard. In one large airline, for example, a specific decision was implemented only after 
union reps, senior pilots, senior flight attendants, and so on, were all consulted and 
everyone had been trained appropriately. On the other hand, a smaller non-unionized 
airline described a specific change as “well pilots got a fair bit of notice. They were sent 
the training materials. They’re all professionals, and so responsible for their own 
preparation”.  
The last, but certainly not least major difference was the cost of labour and 
training. Good employee relationships between management and flight crew generally 
resulted in lower cost of labour. One airline described that because of their internal 
culture they were able to remove all extra “body counts” and cover sickness and absence 
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through a volunteer program were full time employees are paid overtime.  The ability to 
implement such programs can allow airlines with good employee relations to generate 
efficiencies otherwise not possible.  
Interestingly though, one aspect that all interviewees agreed on was that 
monitoring anything on a per pilot or per crew basis, while absolutely possible and even 
valuable, was deemed too big of an intrusion. To quote the interviewees “the pilots would 
feel like big brother is watching them. They wouldn’t like that at all”.  
Pilot and Dispatcher Relationship 
Interestingly enough, the relationship between pilots and dispatchers seemed to be 
constant across all interviews. With the increasing granularity of real time data collection 
and automation, it seems that most of the decisions regarding the flight are performed at 
the dispatcher or prior to the dispatcher with a little wiggle room for the pilot to adjust.  
While in theory pilots have the final say on everything concerning the flight, all 
interviewers agreed that in reality they rarely change anything. One pilot expressed that 
he may speak to his dispatcher perhaps once every three months, and even in that case it 
is usually to clarify something rather than change it. 
Aircraft Types and Policies 
Two main questions for an airline is how many types of aircraft do they operate in 
their fleet and how much flexibility they have in changing. If an airline operates all the 
same aircraft type, then maintenance and scheduling tasks tend to be easier. The airline 
requires less spare parts and can alter switch maintenance schedules quickly based on the 
real time performance of each tail number. In terms of flexibility, crewmembers can 
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operate on any tail number, so flight schedules and destinations can be changed easily 
and quickly.  
On the other hand, diversity in the fleet allows the airline to tailor aircraft to 
specific routes and destination and derive better performance out of each aircraft type. 
Delta Airlines for example, claims that such diversity (19 aircraft types) allows them to 
provide better service to a diverse set of destinations and create efficiencies in doing so. 
Southwest Airlines on the other hand believes that their fleet of only Boeing 737s has 
allowed them to create efficiencies in maintenance and flexibility. The second benefit of 
a diverse fleet is that it more easily allows experimentation with a subgroup. As one 
interviewee described “if you have 10 airplanes of a specific type and you want to try a 
new technology, then you have train maybe 100 crew members and a handful of 
destination. Then you can try that and see how it works. But, when all your aircraft are 
the same now trying to ensure that only those with the training end up on the specific 
aircraft and the specific route that has the new technology would be a scheduling 
nightmare. So you end up with a situation where you have to either train everyone or not 
do it at all”.  
Decision Process 
The single most important factor in any airline’s decision process is the business 
case. For airlines, the ability to make a business case revolves around being able to prove 
the business case. Proving relies on the ability to measure accurately and reliably the 
impact of the required investment. For most investments, it involves two activities. First, 
it involves designing an experiment that can apply a much smaller initial investment to a 
sub group. Then, the experiment must prove the impact of that investment by measuring 
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something specific, and extrapolating those results to show the expected benefit of 
investing in the full solution.  
With most of the examples given through the interviews, the largest challenge 
always seemed to be the measuring part. What do we measure, how do we measure it, 
and how can we minimize the noise in the data to show a relationship between the 
changes we see in what we measure and the investment made. The original small 
investment is somewhat more readily made if there is a logical deduction that there are 
efficiencies to be gained in that area. The harder part is designing an experiment that can 
be contained and provide results that can be extrapolated.  
Once the business case is proven, the extent and speed of adoption depends 
largely on the airline structure. The smaller, flatter, and more agile airlines tend to adopt a 
“just do it” culture. In such cultures adoptions is much quicker and they are more likely 
to invest in even the smallest gains if they believe in the business case. In larger more 
unionized airlines, the next question is the impact on the unions, crews, and so on. It’s not 
necessarily that adoption will not happen, but rather it is a longer process. If the 
efficiencies offered are small, the cost of going through that process may be larger than 
the perceived efficiencies, and therefore, adoption may not happen. As a result, smaller 
and more agile airlines are more likely to make investments that have smaller returns, as 
long as they believe in the validity of the business case. 
 In terms of decision makers, it seems that most initiatives are started at middle 
managements. Upper management must agree to the initial investment and will definitely 
have to approve the final investment. Once the decision is made, the change is usually 
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“pushed down” and implemented. In all interviews, all examples of changes given were 
initiated and implemented in a top-down fashion.  
Change Process 
Once a decision is made to implement a change, the process and duration of that 
change depends on a few main factors. First, it depends on how many external entities 
need to be involved in the change. If it is a change that involves buying form a third 
party, then there is usually a bidding a process and the time required for the third party to 
deliver the desired parts. If the change requires regulatory approval, then it is largely 
dependent on the country, the mandates of the authorities, and their knowledge of the 
technology. For example, approving new RNP procedures is highly dependent on the 
authority’s mandate to facilitate such approvals and their familiarity with RNP 
technology.   
Internally, the change process depends on the extent of the change and the size of 
the airline. If aircrafts need to be upgraded, then the change will happen through the 
airplane’s preset maintenance schedule. The size and diversity of the fleet will have a 
large impact on the duration of this change. If training is required, depending on the type 
of training, for example, classroom, simulator, or online training, then the crew needs to 
be trained in small groups to allow continuing daily airline operations, and that can take 
some time.    
In general, however, all changes described through the interviews took a 
minimum of one year to implement. Many of the bigger changes were planned into a 
five-year plan.  
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Hedging 
Airline use hedging as a way to protect themselves from the variability of the 
market. There are two types of hedging that is most prevalent in the airline industry; fuel 
hedging and currency hedging.  
Long haul carriers tend to be much more sensitive to hedging than other carriers. 
Local or regional carriers tend to operate within markets that use the same currency and 
where fuel prices do not fluctuate much between different departure cities. In such local 
environments, fluctuations in currency or fuel are experienced equally among 
competitors and hedging plays a much smaller role, if any at all. However, long haul 
carriers are operating internationally. They must hedge to protect themselves against 
competitive disadvantages such as currency fluctuations that can diminish the value of 
their revenues compared to local costs of operations and fuel fluctuations that can provide 
competitor airlines of differing nationality a cost advantage.  As a result, hedging 
decisions can have quite a large impact on their balance sheet.  
Fuel 
Decreasing fuel consumption is currently a major concern for most airlines. The 
main reason for this is the increasing price of jet fuel, especially in the past eight years. 
Other reasons include increasing global environmental concerns and the possibility of 
green taxes that will further handicap an already suffering industry.  
As a result, there was agreement among the interviewees that today, all major 
airlines are implementing fuel saving initiatives. They differ only in the extent to which 
they commit resources to such initiatives.  
  
112 
There was also further agreement among the interviewees that decreasing fuel 
consumption is a game of diminishing returns. The single most important factor in 
efficiency in terms of fuel consumption is choice of fleet and aircraft type. Efficiency is 
probably the most important and focused on feature of new aircraft at Boeing, Airbus and 
Bombardier. One interviewer estimated that upgrading airline fleet to the latest aircraft 
can easily provide fuel efficiencies of 30% to 40%.  
From here, airlines can implement a number of fuel reduction initiatives. The 
standard initiatives include one-engine taxi way, gate-to-gate optimization, and at the 
extreme end, performance based navigation (PBN) procedures such as RNP and RNAV. 
Airlines can implement fuel follow up systems in which pilots are incentivized to 
optimize their fuel burn and cost index.  
Factors affecting Fuel Burn 
This section is meant to provide a quick summary of the main factors affecting 
fuel burn. The first factor is the direction of the wind. Head wind creates drag and slows 
down the airplane while tail wind helps the airplane and decreases fuel burn. Sometimes, 
airlines can decrease fuel burn by flying a longer route that offers more favourable winds. 
While the direction of the wind is generally easier to predict, the strength of it on any 
given day is harder to predict. Deciding what route to fly was compared by one 
interviewer with deciding which route to take during rush hour traffic: “Do you take the 
freeway and risk traffic or do you take the back way and opt out for predictability?” 
Another factor affecting fuel burn is enroute weather. Major weather patterns such 
as hurricanes and ash clouds can make a route unsafe and uncomfortable to fly. Other less 
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extreme weather factor include air temperature as aircrafts tend to perform better in 
colder temperatures. 
Another important factor about fuel burn is that the rate is not evenly distributed 
throughout the flight. In general, departures, including takeoffs and climbing tend to 
consume by far the highest rate of fuel burn. One interviewer specified that takeoffs 
consistently burn between 3000 to 4000 pounds of fuel no matter the length of the flight. 
On the other hand, continuous descents, slowing down, and maintaining optimum speed 
will consume the lowest rate of fuel burn. As a result, longer flights will generally result 
in lower average fuel burn per distance (mile or kilometre) than shorter flights.  
The definition of optimum speed is also very important to airlines. First, the flight 
management system on board the aircraft will calculate the most efficient speed and 
altitude for that aircraft at any given time based on aircraft weight and weather 
conditions. This information is then automatically used to calculate a “cost index” which 
balances the additional time related cost of slowing down the airplane and increasing 
flight duration with the savings from decreasing fuel consumption. The resultant 
“optimum speed” is displayed to the pilot in real time.  
Politics and Government Programs 
When asked about any government or political incentives that helped in 
promoting fuel efficiency initiatives, the interviewees mentioned the following programs.  
Tax Programs 
While there was some consensus that some countries provide local government 
incentives to fly greener, the only incentive that was mentioned by name was “ETS” 
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(Emissions Trading Scheme) offered in Europe. When specifically asked about the 
United States, interviewers said that while there was talk of such programs in the future, 
there were currently no incentives in the US.  
RNP / PBN - NextGen (FAA – US) / SESAR (EuroControl – Europe) 
Many interviewers seem to agree that one of the largest leaps in creating fuel 
efficiencies is the adoption of what is referred to in North America as RNP (Required 
Navigation Performance), and in Europe as PBN (Performance Based Navigation) flight 
procedures. One interviewer estimated that today, the average flight travels 50% more 
nautical miles than the most direct route would require, while another interviewer 
estimated that by adopting RNP through all approaches the airline could save at least 1 
minute of flight on each landing. However, the problem is that even if the airlines 
upgrade all equipment, crew, and procedures to adopt this new technology, it is all 
dependent on each airport’s air traffic controller to authorize such landing.  
The NextGen program (by the United States’ Federal Aviation Administration) 
and the SESAR program (by Europes’ EuroControl organization) are two of the strongest 
promoters of this technology who have vowed to implement it throughout North America 
and Europe in the near future. However, currently, the only airline to consistently make 
use of this technology is Canada’s WestJet airline where the technology is used at all 
Canadian destination with the exception of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver airports. 
However, even in WestJet’s case, gaining approval from the air traffic controllers has 
been an uphill battle.  
As far as NextGen and SESAR are concerned, the interviewers expressed a 
different philosophy between the two programs. The US’s NextGen program seems to be 
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taking a bottom-up approach where they have start by implementing what works today 
and then think of the next layer for the future. On the other hand, Europe’s SESAR 
program is taking a top-down approach, where everything must first be implemented in 
theory, and then it is all turned on at the same time. The plan is still for both programs to 
reach the same end at the same time, however, the result is that today, the FAA’s 
NextGen seems to be much further ahead that Europe’s SESAR program.  
Local Standards 
Globally, the two largest bodies that create flight standards are ICAO 
(International Civil Aviation Organization) and the United State’s FAA (Federal Aviation 
Administration). While FAA standards are applied mainly in the United States, ICAO 
standards tend to be used internationally. However, most local governments will adapt 
the ICAO standards slightly for the purposes of operating within that country. Some 
interviewers mentioned that while these differing standards are all very similar, they are 
not necessarily compatible. Accommodating for these differences can create additional 
cost inefficiencies. Furthermore, in adopting new technologies such as RNP, getting 
approval from the different regulatory bodies of each country can also create large time 
delays.  
Route Optimization and Tailored Procedures 
When attempting to optimize flight paths, airlines must first and foremost comply 
with AT mandate. Therefore, in the vast majority of cases, especially at international and 
busier airports, airlines may have no other choice than to fly the common generic 
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published procedures and flight paths. For the remainder of cases, airlines may try several 
things.  
When an airline is considering a new destination or trying to optimize an existing 
destination, the first thing they will do is to negotiate with the airport authorities. In 
geographical areas where visibility is not a common problem, most efficiency can be 
gained by simply asking the air traffic controller for a “visual approach”. In this case, the 
pilot will see the runway and take the shortest and most optimal path. The next option is 
to ask to be redirected to a route that uses a secondary navigational aid or runway that 
better suites the airline’s flight path.  
The above options are most commonly used. In less common cases airlines can 
apply for private or tailored procedures. The most common form of tailored procedures 
are one-engine out departure procedures that are usually created in “problematic airports” 
with short runways, high temperatures, or mountainous geographical areas. These 
procedures are created as much for safety reasons as for efficiency gains.  
More recently, airlines have begun creating tailored procedure to take advantage 
of newer technologies such as PBN (Performance Based Navigation). These procedures 
use the technological capabilities on board the aircraft rather than the ground based 
navigational aids. As a result, they can increase safety, efficiency, and access; especially 
at airports with poor or limited existing infrastructure.  
Gaining approval for tailored procedures, especially those based on newer 
technologies can take between 6 to 12 months, and in some extreme cases even years, 
depending on the comfort level of the regulatory bodies and the local airport air traffic 
controllers with such tailored procedures. Interviewees who had experience with such 
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procedures consistently reported that the hardest and most time consuming part of 
adopting such technologies and tailored procedures involved educating local authorities.  
One of the largest drawbacks of creating tailored procedures is that the airline is 
now responsible in maintaining them and assuring constant accuracies. One interviewer 
reported that, even though that airline was not using any PBN based tailored procedures, 
they still needed two full time employees to maintain their limited set of tailored 
procedures at their 400 airports. If any of the procedures are affected by changes at an 
airport, that procedure then needs to be charted again and reprinted, which requires 
additional cost and turnaround time.  
Charting 
Charting is a global duopoly with Jeppesen holding a monopoly in North America 
and Lido being more prevalent in Europe. When the interviewers were asked their 
opinion about why that is, answers revolved around habits, preferences, and little 
differentiation.  
Jeppesen was the first active charting company in North America. As a result, it 
quickly became the only choice and then, the de facto standard. North American airlines 
chose Jeppesen because the known brand meant reliability and predictability, and because 
most pilots would already be familiar with the Jeppesen graphics. Airlines now tend to 
stay with their chosen charting company because it works, and why change something 
that works. The change itself entails quite a large cost, especially if the airline has a large 
set of tailored procedures. Another problem with switching charting company is that the 
pilots and associated unions need to be convinced.  
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One interviewer said “Like most things in life there’s no one chart that is perfect. 
They each have their advantages”. While all charts will display the same information, 
each charting company will use slightly different graphics and layout. In an industry 
where change is slow and safety is a main concern, breaking old habits, especially within 
the pilot community, can encounter a lot of resistance.  
Another main reason mentioned for staying with the same charting company is 
that Jeppesen and Lido are currently not trying to differentiate on a cost basis. Their cost 
are very comparable and as such do not offer enough of an incentive for airline to 
consider going through the hassle of making such a change.  
One of the most recent changes from the charting perspective is the move from 
paper charts to electronic flight bags. However, all airlines interviewed expressed that the 
current initial investment required to adopt electronic flight bags does not warrant the 
change. They did, however, mention that such change was surely to happen in the future. 
In fact, they predicted that most new airplanes will come out of the factory already 
equipped with the instruments.  
Cargo 
Most airlines create additional revenues by carrying cargo. However, interviewers 
estimated that the revenue from cargo is between 1-2% of passenger revenue for the same 
weight. As a result, while cargo can be used to generate additional revenue, it is never 
used as a replacement to passenger revenue.  
One of the advantages of carrying cargo is the flexibility it provides. Most cargo 
contracts specify a specific amount of cargo to be carried within a specific timeline. As a 
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result, airlines can vary the amount of cargo they carry in each flight based on the 
conditions at the time of the flight.  
Takeoff Weight 
The maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft is calculated based on the one-engine 
out procedure. The idea is to design a procedure that the aircraft can safely fly on a single 
engine failure at critical point of takeoff. The maximum takeoff weight of the aircraft is 
then the maximum weight at which the aircraft can still safely fly the one-engine out 
procedure.  
As explained in the previous sections, aircraft performance is based on many 
environmental factors that can change quite quickly. Therefore, one of the topics 
discussed with the interviewees is how, when, and by whom is this weight calculated.  
The general answer was that there are multiple stages in calculating this weight. 
First, the flight operations engineering group performs the analysis. They look at a range 
of conditions in the various seasons for that particular airport include ranges in 
temperature, barometric pressure, runway conditions, and anything else that could affect 
aircraft performance. From this analysis they develop a set of one-engine out procedures 
that are very specific to a particular runway and aircraft. This analysis is then fed into 
their overall flight planning system.  
Around 2 to 4 hours prior to the actual flight, the dispatcher looks at the actual 
conditions at the airport. Most airlines have a predictive system that looks at the trend in 
weather conditions at the current airport and estimate the conditions at the time of take 
off. About one hour prior to the flight the final flight plan is released to the pilot, which 
  
120 
then include not only the takeoff weight and fuel of the aircraft, but the estimated 
conditions that the calculations were based on.  
Once everyone is on board and everything is loaded, the dispatcher makes final 
calculations based on the actual weight of the aircraft and the current conditions. The 
actual weight of the aircraft is calculated by adding the empty weight of the aircraft 
(which is known before hand) and the weight of the passengers, luggage, cargo, and fuel. 
Passenger weights are calculated by multiplying the number of passengers checked in by 
a weight that is dictated by the regulatory body.  
Interviewees mentioned that in some extreme cases weather conditions can 
change quite quickly. The two factors that can change the quickest are barometric 
pressure during storm season and runways that become contaminated due to rain or snow. 
In such cases the dispatcher will hold the airplane and take some weight off. The primary 
means of reducing weight is by removing cargo. Once all the cargo has been removed, 
the next option is to decrease the number of passengers. For most airlines, this is usually 
the last resource.  
In order to minimize the chances of having to ask passengers to get off the 
airplane, airlines usually cap the capacity of the airplane during risky seasons. For 
example, they may only sell 150 seats in an airplane with a capacity of 166. Passengers 
will then be allowed to fly on “stand-by” if the conditions at the time of the flight allow 
for the additional weight.  
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